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The  legislature's  aims,  if they  are  not  expressed  in  an
appropriate form and scope in the legal norm (statute)  itself,
as the motives for the legislature's actions, have no influence
on  its  content and validity (effectiveness) and  can  not  be
(independently)  evaluated  in  connection  with   them;   more
precisely,  exculpatory  reasons for  violation  of  procedural
rules  (principles),  if  such violation  occurred  during  the
legislative  process, cannot be derived from the  legislature's
aims,  regardless of whether defects in the statute  determined
ex post were caused by the legislature's inattentiveness during
voting  or  its inadequate knowledge of the material  connected
with discussion of the bill.
   A  repeat  vote, regardless of whether it is on an  amending
proposal or on a resolution to approve the bill as a whole,  is
thus  limited  by  two  conditions, namely  a  directly  raised
objection  by  a  deputy  and an affirmative  decision  by  the
Chamber of Deputies about it, and these conditions can only  be
applied  to  defects (errors) in the voting  itself,  that  is,
basically,  to  the  technique of  voting  or  determining  its
result,  not,  however,  to  the  merits  of  the  bill   under
discussion (substantive incorrectness).
   The  legislative  process, in the phase  in  which  a  draft
resolution  is  presented  to the  plenum  of  the  Chamber  of
Deputies, which, by being voted on, is to approve a bill  as  a
whole  (§ 95 para. 3 al. 2 of Act no. 90/1995 Coll.),  is  only
the  conclusion of the decision making process, where a  deputy
no  longer  has  any options other than to  vote  in  favor  or
against  (or  not  vote at all), because  during  the  previous
phases  of the process he had sufficient time and opportunities
to  apply his proposals (express his political positions),  for
his  vote, generally, but especially in this closing phase,  to
be  an  expression (consequence) of his own political decision;
subsequently,  in that process this decision,  as  a  resulting
whole  (compromise)  arises  from  the  will  of  the  majority
expressed in a free vote (Art. 6 sentence 1 of Const.  Act  no.
1/1993 Coll.).
  Therefore, a Chamber of Deputies resolution approving a bill,
must  be seen as a decision containing (in the given procedural
phase)  a  verdict of final validity, whereby  the  legislative
process   in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  ends;  the  statutory
requirement  that  the (Chamber of Deputies) approved  bill  be
sent  by the chairman of the Chamber of Deputies to the  Senate
without  undue  delay (§ 97 para. 1 of Act no. 90/1995  Coll.),
has  neither  a  substantive nor a  time  connection  with  the
Chamber  of  Deputies  decision  making  process  itself,   and
actually, as an instruction of a technical nature, which is  to
avoid administrative delays between the (completed) legislative
process  in  the  Chamber of Deputies and the  decision  making
powers  of  the  Senate (§ 97 para. 2 to 4 of Act  no.  90/1995
Coll.), it has no influence on the Chamber of Deputies decision
making  process  itself, all the less so  could  it  renew  the
process.
   In the legislative process, the foremost requirement is that
legal acts on which the state governed by the rule of law,  and
accordingly  the  life  of citizens in it,  rests,  be  stable,
convincing and necessary; however, such acts and the attainment
of  the  necessary authority of legislative bodies can  not  be
achieved  otherwise than by respect for the rules (fundamentals
of  legislative activity), which, in any case, the  Chamber  of
Deputies  itself,  as a significant bearer of  the  legislative
power, provided by statue for its own activity.



The  Plenum of the Constitutional Court decided, on  2  October
2002,  in the matter of a petition from a group of senators  to
annul  Act  no. 501/2001 Coll., which amends Act  no.  513/1991
Coll.,  the  Commercial Code, as amended by later  regulations,
Act  no.  40/1964  Coll., the Civil Code, as amended  by  later
regulations,  Act no. 99/1963 Coll., the Civil Procedure  Code,
as  amended  by later regulations, Act no. 591/1992  Coll.,  on
Securities,  as amended by later regulations, Act no.  358/1992
Coll., on Notaries and their activities (the Notarial Procedure
Code), as amended by later regulations, Act no. 370/2000 Coll.,
which  amends Act no. 513/1991 Coll., the Commercial  Code,  as
amended  by  later  regulations, Act  no.  358/1992  Coll.,  on
Notaries and their activities (the Notarial Procedure Code), as
amended  by  later regulations, Act no. 15/1998 Coll.,  on  the
Securities  Commission  and amending  and  supplementing  other
Acts,  as  amended by Act no. 30/2000 Coll., Act  no.  200/1990
Coll.,  on  Administrative Infractions,  as  amended  by  later
regulations,  Act no. 99/1963 Coll., the Civil Procedure  Code,
as amended by later regulations, and Act no. 328/1991 Coll., on
Bankruptcy and Settlement, as amended by later regulations, Act
no.  219/2000 Coll., on the Property of the Czech Republic  and
Its  Functioning  in Legal Relationships, as amended  by  later
regulations,  and  Act no. 455/1991 Coll., on  Licensed  Trades
(the Trades Licensing Act), as amended by later regulations, as
follows:

1. Act no. 501/2001 Coll., which amends Act no. 513/1991 Coll.,
the  Commercial Code, as amended by later regulations, Act  no.
40/1964 Coll., the Civil Code, as amended by later regulations,
Act no. 99/1963 Coll., the Civil Procedure Code, as amended  by
later  regulations, Act no. 591/1992 Coll., on  Securities,  as
amended  by  later  regulations, Act  no.  358/1992  Coll.,  on
Notaries and their activities (the Notarial Procedure Code), as
amended  by  later regulations, Act no. 370/2000  Coll.,  which
amends  Act no. 513/1991 Coll., the Commercial Code, as amended
by  later regulations, Act no. 358/1992 Coll., on Notaries  and
their  activities (the Notarial Procedure Code), as amended  by
later  regulations, Act no. 15/1998 Coll.,  on  the  Securities
Commission  and  amending  and  supplementing  other  Acts,  as
amended  by Act no. 30/2000 Coll., Act no. 200/1990  Coll.,  on
Administrative  Infractions, as amended by  later  regulations,
Act no. 99/1963 Coll., the Civil Procedure Code, as amended  by
later  regulations, and Act no. 328/1991 Coll.,  on  Bankruptcy
and  Settlement,  as  amended  by later  regulations,  Act  no.
219/2000 Coll., on the Property of the Czech Republic  and  Its
Functioning  in  Legal  Relationships,  as  amended  by   later
regulations,  and  Act no. 455/1991 Coll., on  Licensed  Trades
(the  Trades  Licensing Act), as amended by later  regulations,
are annulled as of 31 March, 2003.

2.  The  petition to annul § 183b para. 3 let. a)  of  Act  no.
513/1991  Coll.,  the  Commercial Code,  as  amended  by  later
regulations, is denied.


                           REASONING

I.
The group of 22 senators, as an entitled petitioner [§ 64 para.
1  let.  b)  of  Act  no. 182/1993 Coll., as amended  by  later
regulations] proposed the annulment of Act no. 501/2001  Coll.,
which  amends Act no. 513/1991 Coll., the Commercial  Code,  as
amended  by later regulations etc.; according to the  reasoning
of  the  petition the procedure by which the contested Act  was
passed  shows unconstitutional defects, because, after  it  was
approved as document 824 at the 39th session of the Chamber  of
Deputies,  in  the  second reading, with  the  passed  amending
proposal from deputy Pilip [to the formulation of § 183b  para.
3  let.  a)] and subsequently passed in the third reading  with
the  passed  amending proposal (by resolution no. 1828)  on  31
October,  2001, in the next session, at the extraordinary  42nd
session of the Chamber of Deputies, the passing resolution  was
"revoked," and then – after deletion of deputy Pilip's amending
proposal  – the amended bill was newly approved on 15 November,
2001 (by resolution no. 1859), and with this resolution, in the
"corrected" (revoked) version, it was given to the Senate.
   The  Senate  of  the Parliament of the CR  reacted  to  this
procedure,   which   is  unconstitutional  according   to   the
petitioners, at its eleventh session, on 22 November, 2001,  by
stating  that  the  bill,  (and  the  resolution  passing  it),
submitted by the Chamber of Deputies as document no. 150 is not
a  "bill  under Art. 45 of the Constitution of the CR" and  for
that reason did not consider it further.
   According  to the petitioners, the procedure chosen  by  the
Chamber  of  Deputies was justified by an alleged  attempt  "to
prevent serious economic damage which could occur (due to error
by  the Chamber of Deputies)"; however, the petitioners believe
that  such a procedure, however explained, is "in conflict with
the  law."  In the adjudicated matter, this was the "revocation
of  a  final  and  substantive resolution  of  the  Chamber  of
Deputies," by which a bill was (definitively) passed,  and,  in
the  version  thus  passed, was supposed to  be  given  to  the
Senate, as the resolution passing it became "perfected  in  the
moment of the approval vote, which was not directly cast  doubt
upon."
   With reference to the principle of political decision making
according  to  which  a  substantive  decision  by  an  ad  hoc
established majority, passed in a particular situation protects
this  (potentially variable) majority, and in  particular  with
reference to Art. 6 (in connection with Art. 39 para. 1 and  2)
and  also to Art. 47 para. 1 and 3 and Art. 50 para. 2  of  the
Constitution of the CR, and after analysis of the possibilities
under  which the Chamber of Deputies may, within the limits  of
constitutional intentions and statutory safeguards, return to a
passed act (in a new vote), the petitioners concluded that  the
Chamber of Deputies, by the criticized procedure, violated  the
Srelevant  non-amendability of the passed  statute";  thus,  by
passing  the  contested statute the Chamber of  Deputies  found
itself  in  conflict  with  the  constitutional  order  of  the
republic.  Seeking, first of all, annulment of the  entire  Act
no. 501/2001 Coll., the petitioners, in an alternative request,
proposed, for one thing, annulment of the Act's § 183b para.  3
let.   a),   and  for  another,  annulment  of  other   amended
provisions,  which they identified precisely  in  the  proposed
verdict  and  whose  unconstitutionality,  regardless  of   the
unconstitutional manner in which they were passed, they derived
(without  further explanation) from Art. 4 and Art. 11  of  the
Charter  of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, or Art. 1 para.  1
of  the  Protocol to the Convention on the Protection of  Human
Rights   and   Fundamental  Freedoms  and  Art.   26   of   the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
   When called upon by the Constitutional Court, the Chamber of
Deputies  and  the  Senate,  as  parties  to  the  proceedings,
submitted position statements on the petition from the group of
Senators,  under § 69 of Act no. 182/1993 Coll., as amended  by
later  regulations.  In view of the nature  of  the  matter,  a
position  statement  was also requested  from  the  government,
under  §  48  para. 2 of Act no. 182/1993 Coll., as amended  by
later regulations.

II.
Based  on written materials (Chamber of Deputies documents  and
stenographic  records  of the 39th and  42nd  sessions  of  the
Chamber of Deputies) which were submitted to the Constitutional
Court  upon  its  request  by the  Office  of  the  Chamber  of
Deputies, it is evident that
1) concerning the 39th session of the Chamber of Deputies:
a)      the act under review was discussed at the initiative of
  a  group  of  deputies, and, as Chamber of Deputies  document
  no.  824,  was  sent  for  discussion  to  the  economic  and
  constitutional law committees, and was discussed at the  same
  time   by  the  budget  committee,  on  its  own  initiative;
  according  to  those  who proposed the act,  it  concerned  a
  "technical   amendment,  the  core  of  which  consisted   of
  removing technical legislative errors,"
b) a number of amending proposals to the original bill (Chamber
  of  Deputies documents 824/2 – 5) were discussed both in  the
  abovementioned committees, and in detailed debate during  the
  second reading in the full Chamber of Deputies; some of  them
  were  passed by vote of the Chamber of Deputies and some were
  rejected,
c)in  the  course of the third reading, deputy Pilip raised  an
  objection  concerning  the alleged  "non-votability"  of  his
  amending proposal, passed in the second reading [this  was  a
  change  to  §  183b para. 3 let. a)], this was passed  as  an
  "acceptance   of  a  technical  change,"  and  his   amending
  proposal,  raised  previously  in  the  second  reading,  was
  passed  by  a  vote (number 531; out of 177  present,  97  in
  favor, 12 against),
d)the  resolution  by which the Chamber of Deputies  "expressed
  approval  of Chamber of Deputies document 824 as  amended  by
  amending  proposals," was passed under  number  1828  by  the
  necessary majority (vote number 532; out of 177 present,  159
  in  favor,  2 against); during voting and directly afterwards
  none  of the deputies raised an objection against the conduct
  or  result  of  the voting (§ 76 para. 5 and  6  of  Act  no.
  90/1995 Coll.);

2) concerning the 40th session of the Chamber of Deputies, held
on 15 November, 2001, the stenographic record indicates that:
a)this  session  of the Chamber of Deputies was called  by  the
  chairman  under § 51 para. 4 of the rules of  order,  at  the
  request  of 41 deputies, and its conduct was subject  to  the
  regime  for the legislative process in a state of legislative
  emergency  (§  99  of  Act  no.  90/1995  Coll.),  which  was
  declared  for the period from 14 to 21 November, 2001;  after
  debate  the  Chamber decided by a vote (no.  4;  out  of  161
  present,  110  in favor, 48 against), that this regime  would
  continue  during  this  session (§ 99  para.  4  of  Act  no.
  90/1995 Coll.),
b)the  second  point  for  discussion on  the  agenda  was  the
  proposal  from  the  social  democratic  deputies  to  revoke
  Chamber of Deputies resolution no. 1828 of 31 October 2001,
c)the  proposal  was  justified  by  a  representative  of  the
  proponents  –  briefly summarized – on the grounds  that  the
  vote  about  deputy  Pilip's "non-votable" amending  proposal
  (to  §  183b) for one thing, "within the process of approving
  individual  amending proposals, violated the rules  of  order
  of  the  Chamber of Deputies," and for another – with  regard
  to  all the circumstances under which voting on this proposal
  occurred  – the Chamber of Deputies was sufficiently confused
  in  its discussions that "it is evident that it quite clearly
  did not know which proposal it was voting on," whereupon:
d)after discussion, the Chamber of Deputies, by vote

aa)  (number  11; out of 108 present, 84 in favor, 16  against)
revoked its resolution no. 1828 of 31 October 2001, in which it
agreed with the proposal from a group of deputies to issue  the
adjudicated Act,
bb)  (number  15;  out  of 110 present, no  one  in  favor,  98
against), did not pass deputy Pilip's amending proposal  (to  §
183b) and then
cc)  (number  16; out of 105 present, 92 in favor,  4  against)
passed  (as  number 1859) a resolution in which it "approved  a
proposal from a group of deputies to issue an act which  amends
Act  no. 513 of 1991 Coll., the Commercial Code, as amended  by
later  regulations  etc.,  according  to  Chamber  of  Deputies
document  824, as amended by the approved amending  proposals,"
and
dd)  in  this newly passed version gave the bill to the  Senate
for further proceedings; because the Senate did not address the
substance of the Act, after the prescribed period expired (§ 97
para.  2  of Act no. 90/1995 Coll.) the chairman of the Chamber
of  Deputies submitted it to the president for signature (§  98
para. 1 of Act no. 90/1995 Coll.).

Thus,  we  can  summarize  and conclude  that  the  adjudicated
statute went through three phases in the legislative process in
the  Chamber  of  Deputies; in the first phase  it  was  (after
amending proposals were settled) passed by resolution no.  1828
of 31 October 2001, in the second it was revoked on 15 November
2001,  and  subsequently (after the previously passed  amending
proposal from deputy Pilip was rejected in a new vote)  it  was
again,  as  a  whole, approved by resolution  no.  1859  of  15
November 2001, and that new version (with the deletion  of  the
text  of deputy Pilip's amending proposal to § 183b) was  given
to  the  Senate and later to the president of the republic  for
signature; it was published in the Collection of Laws  in  part
180  under  no.  501  with  the date  of  distribution  of  the
Collection being 31 December 2001.

III.
The  opinion  of  a  considerable majority of  the  Chamber  of
Deputies is that, although the Chamber of Deputies approved the
adjudicated statute in its closing vote on 31 October 2001, the
legislative  process itself was not ended thereby, because  the
statute thus passed by the Chamber of Deputies was not given to
the  Senate before the day when the 42nd session was held,  nor
was  it  given to the president of the republic for  signature,
and  because  "after discussion the proposal for  revoking  the
Chamber  of Deputies resolution which approved the bill"  (more
precisely due to the non-amendability of a resolution passing a
bill),  neither  the  Constitution nor a  legal  regulation  of
lesser  legal  force (Act no. 90/1995 Coll., on  the  Rules  of
Order of the Chamber of Deputies) sets a binding deadline,  the
road  to  revoking the passing resolution and newly  discussing
the statute is open."
   In  contrast, the petitioners, relying on the  principle  of
"relative  non-amendability  of  an  (already  validly  passed)
statute," with reference to Art. 6 in connection with  Art.  39
para. 1 and 2, Art. 47 para. 1 and 3 and Art. 50 para. 2 of the
Constitution of the CR, consider the proceedings of the Chamber
of Deputies contested by them to be unconstitutional.
   Given these completely opposing positions, it was up to  the
Plenum  of  the  Constitutional court to  evaluate  and  decide
whether:
  
  a)one  can derive from the existing constitutional order,  or
     from  the  area of ordinary law (Act no. 90/1995 Coll.)  a
     time  or  substantive  deadline beyond  which  a  decision
     already passed by the Chamber of Deputies, whereby a  bill
     was  approved  after a final (closing) vote,  can  not  be
     changed, or whether after revoking a resolution passing  a
     statute the legislative process concerning it can continue
     and a previously passed statute can be discussed again and
     accepted in a new (corrected) version
  b)if  there  is such a boundary, what is its significance  in
     terms   of   protection  of  constitutionality  and   what
     consequences  arise  from exceeding it,  in  other  words,
     whether  the  adjudicated Act no.  501/2001  Coll.,  which
     amends   the   Commercial  Code,  as  amended   by   later
     regulations   etc.,  was  passed  in  a   constitutionally
     prescribed manner.

In  the  Constitutional  Court's opinion,  due  to  their  very
nature,  all the previously mentioned claims of the Chamber  of
Deputies aimed at clarifying the circumstances under which  the
adjudicated revocation occurred, or aimed at the reasons  which
led  the  Chamber of Deputies to the revocation,  are  excluded
from  the  thus delineated topic for decision because they  are
claims  which are not decisive from the viewpoint of evaluating
the  merits of the matter. In any case, both the statements  of
the Chamber of Deputies and the arguments of the government are
directed  exclusively at questions connected with the rules  of
order  of  the Chamber of Deputies, and because in  both  cases
they  completely  ignore the conditions of the constitutionally
prescribed  process for passing laws (§ 68 para. 2 of  Act  no.
182/1993  Coll.,  as  amended by later regulations),  they  are
statements without practical significance.
   The  legislature's  aims, if they are not  expressed  in  an
appropriate form and scope in the legal norm (statute)  itself,
as the motives for the legislature's actions, have no influence
on  its  content and validity (effectiveness) and  can  not  be
(independently)  evaluated  in  connection  with   them;   more
precisely,  exculpatory  reasons for  violation  of  procedural
rules  (principles),  if  such violation  occurred  during  the
legislative  process, cannot be derived from the  legislature's
aims,  regardless of whether defects in the statute  determined
ex post were caused by the legislature's inattentiveness during
voting  or  its inadequate knowledge of the material  connected
with discussion of the bill.
    Therefore,   these  circumstances  remained   outside   the
Constitutional  Court's focus, just as it  consciously  omitted
questions  connected with the claimed error  of  the  deputies,
reasons for possibly excusing that error and so on, because the
claimed illogic of the amending proposal [from deputy Pilip  to
§  183b)], which was passed in the original vote by the  plenum
of  the Chamber of Deputies, and which subsequently became  the
apparent  reason for revoking the final resolution  to  approve
the  discussed statute, after which this amending proposal  was
rejected  in  a  new  vote and deleted from  the  final,  newly
approved text of the statute.

IV.
Although the legislative process, as governed by the Act on the
Rules  of  Order  of the Chamber of Deputies (Act  no.  90/1995
Coll.),  is not built on the principle of the infallibility  of
the   legislators,  nevertheless,  in  various  (theoretically)
possible  variations  of the mechanism of repeated  voting  and
reasons for it, the currently valid law specifies conditions so
that  it  reserves to each deputy the right, during a  vote  or
directly afterwards, that is, after the chairman of the session
has,  in  the prescribed manner, announced the results  of  the
vote  and announced that a resolution was passed (§ 76 para.  1
of Act no. 90/1995 Coll.), to raise an objection, either to the
course of the voting or the result (ditto para. 5), and only if
the  objection  thus raised is accepted by the  plenum  of  the
Chamber  of Deputies (without revocation of the previous  vote)
is it possible to repeat the vote, not, however, to return to a
bill in new discussion.
   A  repeat  vote, regardless of whether it is on an  amending
proposal or on a resolution to approve the bill as a whole,  is
thus  limited  by  two  conditions, namely  a  directly  raised
objection  by  a  deputy  and an affirmative  decision  by  the
Chamber  of  Deputies about it. Moreover, due to their  nature,
these conditions can only be applied to defects (errors) in the
voting  itself, that is, basically, to the technique of  voting
or  determining its result, not, however, to the merits of  the
bill   under  discussion  (substantive  incorrectness).   Other
mechanisms  are constitutionally prescribed for removing  these
errors  (Art.  47 para. 2, Art. 47 para. 1 and 3  and  Art.  50
para.  2  of Const. Act no. 1/1993 Coll., as amended  by  later
regulations); through these mechanisms the Chamber of Deputies,
but  under  different  procedural  conditions,  can  return   a
previously  approved bill, and discuss it again – in connection
with   reservations  from  the  Senate  or  with  its  amending
proposals  or  with  reservations from  the  president  of  the
republic  – and decide on them by a repeat vote. In that  case,
however,  this is not a procedure initiated by the  Chamber  of
Deputies' own decision, but one which is the procedural  result
of  the  lack  of approval of another party in the  legislative
process  with  the bill as passed by the Chamber  of  Deputies,
and,  as  that  party's  constitutionally  defined  power,   it
requires  the  Chamber of Deputies to conduct a new  vote  (new
discussion   within   the  intentions   of   the   disagreement
expressed).  In  relation to the approved  bill,  however,  the
power of the Chamber of Deputies itself, as is indicated by its
rules  of  order  and ultimately also from the  nature  of  the
legislative process as a decision making process in general, is
exhausted by the passage of a resolution in which it approved a
bill,  that is, a – procedurally – uncontested announcement  of
the results of a vote by the chairman of the session.
   The  legislative  process, in the phase  in  which  a  draft
resolution  is  presented  to the  plenum  of  the  Chamber  of
Deputies, which, by being voted on, is to approve a bill  as  a
whole  (§ 95 para. 3 al. 2 of Act no. 90/1995 Coll.),  is  only
the  conclusion of the decision making process, where a  deputy
no  longer  has  any options other than to  vote  in  favor  or
against  (or  not  vote at all), because  during  the  previous
phases  of the process he had sufficient time and opportunities
to  apply his proposals (express his political positions),  for
his  vote, generally, but especially in this closing phase,  to
be  an  expression (consequence) of his own political decision;
subsequently,  in that process this decision,  as  a  resulting
whole  (compromise)  arises  from  the  will  of  the  majority
expressed in a free vote (Art. 6 sentence 1 of Const.  Act  no.
1/1993 Coll.).
  Therefore, a Chamber of Deputies resolution approving a bill,
must  be seen as a decision containing (in the given procedural
phase)  a  verdict of final validity, whereby  the  legislative
process   in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  ends;  the  statutory
requirement  that  the (Chamber of Deputies) approved  bill  be
sent  by the chairman of the Chamber of Deputies to the  Senate
without  undue  delay (§ 97 para. 1 of Act no. 90/1995  Coll.),
has  neither  a  substantive nor a  time  connection  with  the
Chamber  of  Deputies  decision  making  process  itself,   and
actually, as an instruction of a technical nature, which is  to
avoid administrative delays between the (completed) legislative
process  in  the  Chamber of Deputies and the  decision  making
powers  of  the  Senate (§ 97 para. 2 to 4 of Act  no.  90/1995
Coll.), it has no influence on the Chamber of Deputies decision
making  process  itself, all the less so  could  it  renew  the
process.
   For  the  reasons  thus laid out, the  Constitutional  Court
concluded  that  the  question posed in III  let.  a)  must  be
answered  in the affirmative: it can be derived, both from  the
constitutional order of the Czech republic, and  from  ordinary
law (Act no. 90/1995 Coll.), and from the nature of the matter,
that an uncontested announcement of the results of a vote on  a
resolution, in which the Chamber of Deputies expressed approval
with  a  bill as a whole, is a material and time limit,  beyond
which   revocation  of  this  resolution  and  subsequent   new
discussion  of  the  bill  revoked are  not  permissible,  also
because  –  apart from the reasons already laid out –  in  this
subsequent new discussion of the adjudicated act the conditions
of a proper legislative process were not fulfilled; stated more
precisely  and  completely, this process was completely  absent
from the constitutional safeguards.

V.
If  the  Chamber  of  Deputies, under  circumstances  mentioned
previously,  moreover after a period of  some  time  and  at  a
different  session, addressed revocation of its own  resolution
(of 31 October, number 1828), in which it approved the draft of
the  adjudicated statute, and in this newly opened  legislative
process  again discussed the previously approved bill and  then
passed  a  different version of it, it burdened the legislative
process  concerning  the  bill with a defect  which,  from  the
viewpoint of procedural integrity, cannot be ignored.
   In  a  number  of  its judgments concerning  the  review  of
decision  making  by  public bodies, the  Constitutional  Court
repeatedly  laid  out  principles based on  which  –  from  the
viewpoint of the elements of a state based on the rule of  law,
among other things – respect for procedural rules is essential;
in   brief:  the  settled  decision  making  practice  of   the
Constitutional  Court  concluded that only  in  a  procedurally
flawless process (a constitutional proceedings) can a legal and
constitutional  result  (decision) be achieved,  and  therefore
increased attention must be paid to the procedural integrity of
the  decision  making  process (proceedings)  and  it  must  be
provided considerable protection.
   If  these  principles  related to the  constitutionality  of
proceedings before public bodies and to decision issued in them
(to  the  specified  procedure under Art. 36  para.  1  of  the
Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights and Freedoms),  there  are  no
reasonable grounds to diverge from these principles in  matters
of review of the legislative process and statutes (legal norms)
passed  in  them,  because, although the  legislative  decision
making process differs to a certain degree from decision making
processes in proceedings before other public bodies  –  and  in
that  sense  it can be understood as a decision making  process
sui  generis  –  the guiding principles of decision  making  in
which  a final result is reached are, in both cases, identical.
Moreover,  one  can  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  the
consequences  arising from legislative acts are, due  to  their
society-wide effect, certainly more significant that  in  cases
of  individual  (defective) decisions by other  public  bodies.
Thus,  in the legislative process, the foremost requirement  is
that legal acts on which the state governed by the rule of law,
and  accordingly the life of citizens in it, rests, be  stable,
convincing and necessary; however, such acts and the attainment
of  the  necessary authority of legislative bodies can  not  be
achieved  otherwise than by respect for the rules (fundamentals
of  legislative activity), which, in any case, the  Chamber  of
Deputies  itself,  as a significant bearer of  the  legislative
power, provided by statue for its own activity.
   Taking that into account, as well as the reasons which  were
already  laid out in this judgment's reasoning, the requirement
in  the rules of order, aimed at the chairman of the Chamber of
Deputies, namely, that a bill which the Chamber of Deputies has
approved be sent to the Senate without delay (§ 97 para.  1  of
Act  no. 90/1995 Coll.), or the question of whether and to what
extent that requirement was met in the adjudicated matter,  is,
in  terms  of the protection of constitutionality (Art.  83  of
Const.  Act  no. 1/1993 Coll.), not decisive in the  matter  at
hand;  likewise the reasons which the Chamber of Deputies cites
to  support  the claimed permissibility of its revocation  will
not  hold  up.  Although – unlike in the previous constitutions
(of the Czechoslovak state) – the content of the rules of order
of  the Chamber of Deputies is not constitutionally delineated,
there  are  no  reasonable  grounds to  doubt  that  the  basic
principles for the actions of legislative assemblies, and  also
the  principles for contact between both chambers (and with the
government)  and  externally may not exceed the  constitutional
framework  at  all.  Likewise the claim  that  the  adjudicated
matter  concerned a significantly complicated bill and that  in
the  closing  phase of the legislative process  (in  the  third
reading) the Chamber of Deputies was so confused that it "quite
clearly did not know which bill it was voting on," is, from the
aspect  of procedural integrity of the decision making process,
of no significance whatsoever.
  The complexity of the materials which the Chamber of Deputies
discusses,  the  number  or  variety  of  amending  and   other
proposals  which are raised concerning a bill in the course  of
discussions,  can  not, either by themselves or  in  connection
with  an  ex  post  attempt "to correct an  error  and  prevent
serious    economic   damage,"   justify   violation    of    a
constitutionally protected procedure in the legislative process
and the principles already laid out.
   It  has  already  been  mentioned that  in  a  parliamentary
democracy  political  decisions arise  from  the  will  of  the
majority, expressed in a free vote; conditions which, under the
safeguards  expressly  stated by the Constitution,  ensure  the
constitutional legitimacy and the legality of a  decision,  and
which   form  the  relevant  majority  during  the  legislative
process, are, of course, diverse, and virtually always not only
attach  to the material which is the subject of discussion  and
subsequent  decision,  but are themselves  influenced,  in  the
creation  of  a  majority ad hoc, by the  given  time,  or  the
circumstances   which  arise  from  it.  The  majorities   thus
established relevant to making a decision (approving  a  bill),
of  course are (may be) variable, not infrequently so much  so,
that  over  time, in the cited situation they can (could)  lose
their  numerical relevance and become a minority, which  would,
however,  be exposed to the danger of reversal of a  previously
accepted  decision. The protection of majorities thus  created,
more precisely their previously accepted decision, is therefore
necessary  not  only in terms of the stability of  legal  acts,
but,  as  the  result of agreement reached at a given  time  (a
compromise  of political will), are also one of the  guarantees
of  constitutionally which prevents arbitrariness  in  decision
making,  arbitrariness for which, naturally, there is no  room.
In other words: the fact that an approved bill has not yet been
sent  to  the Senate by the chairman of the Chamber of Deputies
does  not  create grounds for the Chamber of Deputies to  renew
the  already completed decision making process on the bill  and
return  to  it in new decision making on the merits. Therefore,
the moment when the decision making process in a given phase of
the  legislative process irreversibly ended by the making of  a
decision is sufficiently significant, not only for the legality
of  the  decision  made, but also for its stability,  that  the
limit  set  by it can not be constitutionally crossed,  and  as
such,  in  its  essence  is supposed to prevent  the  potential
danger  of usurpation of a power which does not belong  to  the
Chamber  of  Deputies.  The opposing majority  opinion  of  the
Chamber  of  Deputies  is erroneous also because,  in  a  state
governed  by the rule of law, "State authority is to serve  all
citizens and may be asserted only in cases, within the  bounds,
and  in  the  manner provided for by law." (Art. 2 para.  3  of
Const.  Act no. 1/1993 Coll., as amended by later regulations);
thus, not every wish of a parliamentary body, but only such  as
respects the law, whether constitutional or ordinary (its rules
of order) and is based on its limitations, can become law.
  Therefore, the Constitutional Court concluded that the second
question posed above under III let. b) must also be answered in
the affirmative: exceeding the bounds of non-amendability of an
accepted  decision  (a  resolution which approved  the  statute
under  discussion)  and the principles  laid  out  above  is  a
violation of the constitutionality of the legislative  process;
therefore, the adjudicated Act no. 501/2001 Coll., which amends
Act  no.  513/1991 Coll., the Commercial Code,  as  amended  by
later  regulations  etc.,  was not passed  by  the  Chamber  of
Deputies in a constitutionally prescribed manner.
   This conclusion, in and of itself, makes redundant review of
the  constitutionality of the adjudicated statute's  individual
provisions,  which the petitioners identify as unconstitutional
in   their  alternative  request,  and  therefore  it  was  not
necessarily to review them as individual matters.

VI.
In  its  deliberations, the Constitutional Court did not ignore
the position statement of the government which, although it  is
not  a  party to these proceedings, according to the  statement
provided  as  requested,  believes  that  because  of  possible
considerable problems, for example in the capital markets,  and
because  of error in the conduct of a critical session  of  the
Chamber of Deputies, in which the adjudicated statute was first
passed,  "it would be appropriate to tolerate even a relatively
problematic  revocation,  especially  if  it  occurred  in  the
interest  of  creating  an  opportunity  for  the  deputies  to
consciously  express  their  will.  Although  the  government's
reminder must be taken with all seriousness, and although there
is no doubt that the amendment of the Commercial Code brings  a
number  of desirable changes, these facts can not outweigh  the
fundamental postulate of constitutionality, that is, that  laws
be  passed  by  the  legislative  bodies  of  Parliament  in  a
constitutionally prescribed manner (Art. 1,  Art.  2  para.  3,
Art.  45  of Const. Act no. 1/1993 Coll., as amended  by  later
regulations).
   Because the disputed issues in § 183b para. 3 let. a) of the
adjudicated statute, against which the petitioners' substantive
reservations are primarily aimed, can not be separated from the
other material, as the Chamber of Deputies, by resolution of 15
November 2001 (no. 1859) revoked its previous resolution of  31
October  2001  (no.  1828), which approved this  statute  as  a
whole,  there was no alternative but to annul Act no.  501/2001
Coll.,  which  amends  Act no. 513/1991 Coll.,  the  Commercial
Code,  as  amended by later regulations etc.,  for  not  having
being  passed in a constitutionally prescribed manner, in  view
of the circumstances described by the government, as of the day
evident from the verdict of this judgment (§ 70 para. 1 of  Act
no. 182/1993 Coll., as amended by later regulations).
   The negative verdict concerning the petition to annul § 183b
para. 3 let. a) of Act no. 513/1991 Coll., the Commercial Code,
as  amended by later regulations, is supported by the fact that
a  formally and substantively identical petition was filed with
the  Constitutional  Court on 13 December  2001  and  is  being
considered  independently under file no. Pl.  US  38/01;  thus,
that verdict is justified by the obstacle of lis pendens (§  35
para.  2  of  Act  no.  182/1993 Coll.,  as  amended  by  later
regulations).

Notice:  Decisions  of  the Constitutional  Court  can  not  be
appealed (§ 54 para. 2 of Act no. 182/1993 Coll., as amended by
later regulations).

Brno, 2 October 2002