Pl. US 34/02
                               

The   guarantee   of   territorial   self-government   in   the
Constitution is laconic. Alongside the differentiation  of  the
local   and  regional  levels  of  self-government  (Art.   99)
territorial  self-government is conceived as  the  right  of  a
territorial   association  of  citizens,   arising   from   its
characteristics  and  abilities, as  the  Constitutional  Court
stated in its finding of 19 November 1996, file no. Pl. US 1/96
(Collection of Decisions of the Constitutional Court, volume 6,
p. 375).
   "The Constitutional Court considers local self-government to
be  an irreplaceable component in the development of democracy.
Local  self-government is an expression of  the  capability  of
local  bodies, within the bounds provided by law,  to  regulate
and govern para.t of public affairs on their own responsibility
and in the interest of the local population."
  The Constitution makes it possible to support this capability
by,  among other things, establishing the legal subject  status
of  territorial self-governing units, and presumes  that  self-
governing  units have their own property and manage  themselves
out  of  their own budget (Art. 101 para.a.. 3). The democratic
character   of  self-government  is  also  confirmed   at   the
constitutional level in the guarantee of elected representative
bodies  (Art. 101 para.. 1 and 2 and Art. 102). Of course,  the
Constitution  also presumes uniform state regulation  of  self-
government  in  a statutory framework. The definition  of  that
para.t  of public affairs which a local or regional association
of  citizens  is  capable  of  managing  is  entrusted  to  the
legislature,  i.e.  the  state power (Art.  104),  not  to  the
constitutional  framers,  who would  define  matters  of  local
significance  at  the  highest level. The  constitutions  of  a
number  of other European states also rely on the authorization
of  the  legislature to define matters of territorially limited
importance  which  are entrusted to territorial  self-governing
units.
   The  right  to  self-government generally expressed  by  the
Constitution  certainly may not be depleted by the legislature,
but  it  is  certain  that the legislature has  wide  space  to
determine  which  affairs  are best managed  at  the  local  or
regional  level  without greater interference  by  the  central
state  power.  It  is difficult to determine in  advance,  non-
politically,  expressly  from legal,  economic,  political  and
other  points  of  view, which matters have local  or  regional
effect and therefore deserve to be taken out of the purview  of
the  central  power. Decision making about the jurisdiction  of
territorial self-government is always political.. Even  matters
of  clearly  local or regional character can acquire state-wide
significance,  for  example,  fundamental  human   rights   and
freedoms may be affected or consequences can be carried  across
the  borders  of the territorial self-governing association  of
residents,  which  is increasingly frequent in  an  environment
with a highly mobile population.
   It  can  not  be overlooked that the Constitution  expressly
presumes (Art. 105) that territorial self-governing units  will
share  in the exercise of state power on the basis of statutory
authorization. Such sharing of the exercise of state  power  of
course brings with it the subordination of self-governing units
to  state inspection, the purpose of which is to ensure quality
exercise   of  state  power.  This  subordination  must   also,
understandably,  be  based on statute. The constitutional  does
not   say   unambiguously  whether  the   exercise   of   state
administration  can be imposed upon territorial  self-governing
units  compulsorily, or whether it is possible to execute  such
statutory  transfer only on the basis of an  agreement  between
the state and the territorial self-governing unit. In light  of
the emphasis on self-government, the requirement of a consensus
would certainly appear stronger. On the other hand, however, it
is   evident  that  uniform  exercise  of  state  power   under
transferred jurisdiction by municipalities, cities, and regions
is  generally  accepted  in this country  and  has  never  been
disputed   as   incompatible  with  the  right  of  territorial
associations of citizens to self-government. Even the group  of
senators does not dispute it, as such, in its petition to annul
some provisions of Act no. 320/2002 Coll.
  The Czech constitutional standard of local self-government is
supplemented and enriched by a standard which arises  from  the
international  obligations of the Czech Republic,  namely  from
the  Charter  of Local Self-Government, agreed  on  15  October
1985,  which  entered into force for the Czech  Republic  on  1
September  1999, published in the Council of Europe  under  no.
122  ETS and in the Czech Republic under no. 181/1999 Coll. and
no. 369/1999 Coll.
  The Local Charter is not a classic agreement on human rights;
it  does not concern individuals, but associations of citizens,
and  it  establishes collective rights. The  idiosyncrasies  of
interpreting  and applying it follow from this.  The  rules  it
expresses,  which create the European standard of  local  self-
government,  can  only with difficulty be  self-executing.  The
European  standard of territorial self-government is  expressed
by qualities which a para.ty's self-governments are to exhibit,
or  rights  which  they  are to enjoy. The  para.ties  have  an
obligation  to  guarantee their territorial self-governments  a
certain  number of such rights determined by the Local Charter.
Rights guaranteed by the Local Charter to the territorial self-
governments of the para.ties are a framework. The Local Charter
itself,  in a number of provisions, presumes detailed  domestic
law  regulation  which surely represents  bounds  within  which
territorial self-government will apply. It definitely does  not
guarantee the full freedom of territorial self-government. That
is  not the European tradition. Statutes, or other regulations,
depending  on  the choice and tradition of the  para.ties,  may
define  in  detail the range of matters managed by  territorial
self-government,  including those which a  self-governing  unit
has  an  obligation to pursue, its organization, including  the
form  and  status  of  individual  bodies,  may  determine  the
framework  for  management,  and  may  allocate  property   and
financial resources. The Local Charter certainly does not  make
territorial self-governing units into sovereign bodies  similar
to states.


The  Plenum of the Constitutional Court decided 5 February 2003
on  a petition from a group of Senators of the Para.liament  of
the Czech Republic to annul points 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 11 Art.
CXVII of Act no. 320/2002 Coll., Amending and Repealing Certain
Acts  in  Connection  with Ending the  Activities  of  District
Offices, as follows:
  The petition is denied.


                           REASONING

I.
The  group  of  senators  filed with the Constitutional  Court,
under Art. 87 para.. 1 let. a) of the Constitution of the Czech
Republic (the "Constitution") and § 64 para.. 1 let. b) of  Act
no. 182/1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, a petition  to
annul  some provisions of Act no. 320/2002 Coll., Amending  and
Repealing Certain Acts in Connection with Ending the Activities
of District Offices.
   The group of senators seeks annulment of the legal framework
which provides for transferring the employment relationships of
employees,  officials  of district offices,  which  are  to  be
terminated as of 1 January 2003 under Art. CXVII of point 1  of
Act  no. 320/2002 Coll., the Act whose selected provisions  are
proposed  to  be annulled, to territorial self-governing  units
(municipalities  and cities authorized to exercise  transferred
jurisdiction  and regions) without the affected employees'  own
decision  and  likewise without the consent of the  appropriate
self-governing  units. The legal framework  which  orders  this
change is contained in points 2, 5 and 8 Art. CXVII of Act  no.
320/2002 Coll., in this wording:
   2.  The rights and obligations from employment relationships
of employees of the Czech Republic assigned to work in district
offices (a "district office employee") are transferred from the
Czech  Republic  to territorial self-governing units  in  cases
where the activities of a district office employee provided  by
this  Act  or a special law are transferred to the jurisdiction
of territorial self-governing units.
   5.  In  the  event that an agreement under point  3  is  not
reached by 1 September 2002, the Ministry of the Interior shall
set the numbers and rules for re-assignment of employees to the
appropriate  territorial self-governing units or administrative
offices at the proposal of the chairman of the district  office
and  with  the  recommendation of the director of the  regional
office.
   8.  The  provisions of § 102 para.. 2 let.  j)  of  Act  no.
128/2000 Coll., on Districts (District Establishment), and § 59
para..  1  let.  b)  of  Act  no. 129/2000  Coll.,  on  Regions
(Regional  Establishment), on Setting the Numbers of  Employees
of  Territorial Self-Governing Units shall not apply  to  cases
under point 2.
   The  group  of senators claims that with this framework  the
legislature  violated  and limited the fundamental  rights  and
principles of the organization of state power enshrined in Art.
8, Art. 79 para.. 3 and Art. 100 para.. 1 and Art. 101 para.. 4
of the Constitution, Art. 2 para.. 2, Art. 4 para.. 1, 2 and  4
and  Art.  9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and  Freedoms
(the  "Charter"), Art. 6 para.. 1 of the Charter of Local Self-
Government  (the  "Local  Charter")  a  Art.  4  para..  2  the
Convention  on  Protection  of  Human  Rights  and  Fundamental
Freedoms (the "Convention").
   The  group of senators points to Art. 8 and Art. 100 of  the
Constitution,  which  declare  self-governing   units   to   be
territorial  associations of citizens with the right  to  self-
government  in  the  form of sharing in the exercise  of  state
power   through   their  representatives.  It   points   to   a
Constitutional Court decision (Pl. US 1/96) and Art. 3 para.. 1
of  the Local Charter, under which local self-government is  an
expression of the capability of local bodies, within the bounds
provided  by  law,  to  regulate and govern  para.t  of  public
affairs on their own responsibility and in the interest of  the
local  population. This includes the ability to set the numbers
of   self-government  employees.  State  interference  in  this
autonomy degrades self-government into the form it took  before
1989,  the model of national committees controlled from  above.
Territorial self-governing units are independent subjects which
act  in  their  own name, which bear their own  responsibility,
including as employers. Autonomous decision making on employees
is  set  by  §  102  of  Act no. 128/2000 Coll.,  on  Districts
(District  Establishment), and § 59 of Act no. 129/2000  Coll.,
on  Regions (Regional Establishment). Under Art. 6 para.. 1  of
the Local Charter, it is local associations which set their own
internal structure according to their needs. Authoritative  re-
assignment  of employees interferes with self-governing  units'
management of their own property, because it forces them to use
para.t  of their assets to pay the employees. However, it  does
not take the local financial situation into account.
   The  group  of  senators recognizes that  territorial  self-
government  is  not  unlimited; it may be  interfered  with  to
protect  the law and in a manner provided by law. The contested
provisions of the Act, according to the group of senators,  are
not capable of causing the transfer of employment relationships
under  §  249  of the Labor Code. The contested point  2  is  a
general  declaration, and no succession can be  implemented  on
the  basis  of it, which, in any cases, also follows  from  the
fact  that it is not effective until 1 January 2003. Therefore,
transfer  is only possible on the basis of agreement (point  3)
or re-assignment (point 5). There is no objection to agreement.
In  contrast,  authoritative  re-assignment  (point  5)  is   a
violation   of   constitutional  principles   for   legislative
regulation,  as  it  is not the Act but  the  Ministry  of  the
Interior  that  decides on the re-assignment  of  employees  to
individual  self-governing  units.  Thus,  this  violates   the
legislature's obligation under Art. 4 para.. 1 of  the  Charter
to  impose obligations only on the basis of statute and  within
its  bounds.  Nor  does this meet the requirement  in  Art.  79
para..  3  of  the  Constitution,  under  which  administrative
offices  may  issue legal regulations only on the  basis  of  a
statue and within its bounds, if they are authorized thereto by
the  statute.  The legislature did not set the bounds  of  this
legislative activity by the Ministry of the Interior.  Point  5
governs "rules and numbers." According to the group of senators
this  means  that  the Ministry's decision is  of  a  normative
nature. The Constitutional Court has already repeatedly  stated
that the legislature and the executive branch may not apply the
forms of law arbitrarily, but must be governed by the directive
of  the  framers  of the constitution and the  requirements  of
transpara.ency, accessibility and clarity (finding no. 167/2000
Coll.). This requirement has not been met in this case,  as  it
is  not clear whether a decision is published and to whom it is
delivered.  The  Act does not indicate which territorial  self-
governing unit employees are to be transferred to. In practice,
the  decision  is made by the chairman of the district  office.
Means  of  redress  against such decisions are  lacking.  Thus,
state power is applied inconsistently with Art. 2 para..  2  of
the  Charter,  because  statutory  limits  for  regulation  are
missing.  This  also  violates Art. 101  of  the  Constitution.
Interference  into the activities of territorial self-governing
units  is  supposed to be determined by statute,  in  order  to
protect  it. Termination of district offices is not a necessary
reason for employing former state employees.
  The group of senators also points to the need to evaluate the
disputed provisions of Act no. 320/2002 Coll. from the point of
view  of  the  employees. Re-assignment binds the employees  to
another entity, probably to work in another place, and maybe to
perform work of a different kind, without their will to do  so.
The  conclusion that this labor is of a forced  nature  is  not
changed  by  the  possibility  of giving  notice,  because  the
employee  will  have  to  work during  the  notice  period.  In
addition, he would not be entitled to severance pay. Therefore,
the disputed regulation is inconsistent with Art. 4 para.. 2 of
the  Convention  and  Art. 9 para.. 1  of  the  Charter,  which
prohibit  forced  labor, and none of the exceptions  have  been
met. Moreover, the forced labor is not provided by statute  but
by a re-assignment decision.
   Because  of  their  connection to the transfer  of  district
office employees' employment relationships to territorial self-
governing  units, the group of senators also proposes annulling
related provisions, points 6, 7, 9 and 11 Art. CXVII of Act no.
320/2002 Coll., which read as follows:
   6.  In  cases where a district office employee's  activities
provided  by this Act are not transferred to territorial  self-
governing  units  under  point 2, the exercise  of  rights  and
obligations  from  a  district  office  employee's   employment
relationships  is transferred from the district office  to  the
Office  for State Representation in Property Matters, unless  a
special  regulation provides otherwise. These  employees  shall
secure  the  performance of tasks related  to  terminating  the
activities of district offices after 1 January 2003.
    7.   District  office  employees'  entitlements  based   on
employment  relationships which were  not  transferred  to  the
appropriate territorial self-governing units under point 2,  as
well  as  entitlements  of the Czech Republic  from  employment
relationships  vis-à-vis  district office  employees  shall  be
satisfied  and  exercised  in the name  of  the  state  by  the
Ministry of Finance.
  9. The provisions of § 251d of the Labor Code shall not apply
to procedures under points 2 and 3.
   11.  Personal  property owned by the  Czech  Republic  which
district  offices  had  jurisdiction to  manage  and  which  is
necessary for the performance of activities transferring to the
jurisdiction of territorial self-governing units under this Act
and which is used by district office employees to whom point  2
applies  shall  be  transferred, with the exception  of  things
specified  in  point 12, as of 1 January 2003  from  the  Czech
Republic  to that territorial self-governing unit to which  the
rights  and  obligations from employment relationships  of  the
district office employees are being transferred.

II.
The  Chamber  of  Deputies  of the Para.liament  of  the  Czech
Republic,  in its position statement, points to the  background
report  to  the draft Act, which points out that the draft  act
also  addresses the employment relationships of district office
employees. The aim of the re-assignment provision is to  ensure
the   proper  performance  of  state  administration   by   the
territorial self-governing units to which individual  areas  of
jurisdiction  will be transferred by trained  employees,  those
who are already performing these activities. In cases where  an
employee does not agree to be transferred to a territorial self-
governing  unit or to the Ministry of the Interior,  labor  law
procedures  will be followed. The petitioners' opinion  appears
self-serving  and  one-sided,  as  it  does  not  observe   the
requirements for the exercise of state power, specifically  the
need  for a professional appara.atus. Personnel provisions  are
connected  to the reform of public administration. In  view  of
the  fact  that  a  fundamental condition for re-assignment  is
agreement   by  the  para.ties,  this  does  not,   under   any
circumstances,  create forced labor or services.  Granting  the
petition  threatens  to  endanger  the  employment  and  social
certainties  of district office employees who agreed  with  the
transfer of themselves and their functions to regional  offices
or   district   offices   of   municipalities   with   expanded
jurisdiction. According to the statement, the Act was  properly
approved,    signed    by   the   appropriate    constitutional
representatives, and promulgated. The Chamber  of  Deputies  is
convinced  that  the Act is consistent with the  constitutional
order and the legal order.
   The Senate of the Para.liament of the Czech Republic, in its
position  statement,  points out the circumstances  surrounding
the  passage  of  the  Act.  An amending  proposal  was  filed,
pointing to the impermissibility of authoritative re-assignment
as  non-permitted  interference  into  the  self-government  of
municipalities and regions. However, the Senate did  not  agree
with  this  proposal. The Act was returned to  the  Chamber  of
Deputies  with  those  amending  proposals  which  the   Senate
accepted.  Concerning the petition from the group of  senators,
the  Senate  points out that under Art. 105 of the Constitution
the  exercise of state administration can be entrusted to self-
governing bodies only by statute. That is what Act no. 320/2002
Coll. is. It transfers the exercise of state administration  to
territorial  self-governing units in an  unprecedented  extent,
and   some   activities  are  entrusted  to   the   independent
jurisdiction of territorial self-governing units.  It  aims  to
significantly  strengthen  the position  of  territorial  self-
governing  units, not to attempt to limit their  constitutional
right  to self-government. The contested provisions ensure  the
proper  implementation  of  the  transfer  of  jurisdiction  to
municipalities   and   regions.   The   exercise    of    state
administration  is  decision  making  about  the   rights   and
obligations of citizens and legal entities. Therefore, it is in
the   general  interest  to  have  adequate  personnel  in  the
authorized   territorial  self-governing  units.  The   general
framework  of  the contested point 2 is made more  specific  by
further provisions, which give priority to the jurisdiction  of
territorial  self-governing units  in  setting  the  number  of
employees.   Authoritative   re-assignment   is   an    extreme
possibility. In this context the provision on the non-necessity
of  a  decision  by the council of the appropriate  territorial
self-governing unit on the number of employees will  also  hold
up.  Self-government of municipalities and regions  is  not  an
untouchable value. Territorial self-governing units are  public
law corporations whose priority when fulfilling their tasks  is
not  the  protection of their own interests, but above all  the
obligation to care for the needs of citizens and to protect the
public  interest. The quality of decision making  is  certainly
such  a  public  interest. The Senate concluded that  providing
personnel  for the reform of the public administration  through
the  transfer of employees from terminated district offices  to
municipalities  and regions will most effectively  ensure  good
quality decision making practices. Therefore it agreed with the
legal  framework  at  issue.  The Minister  of  the  Interior's
assurance  that, as para.t of organizational measures connected
to  the reform of the public administration, corresponding wage
funds  would be transferred to territorial self-governing units
together  with  state  employees  also  contributed   to   this
decision.  The Senate further believes that the legal framework
creates  an  adequate statutory framework for implementing  the
transfer of employees. In response to the alleged forced nature
of  labor  in  the transfer on the basis of re-assignment,  the
Senate  states that the general framework for the  transfer  of
rights  and obligations provided in a number of other  statutes
would then also have to be found unconstitutional. The transfer
of  rights and obligations from employment relationships  means
that there is a change of employer, where a new employer enters
into  all  the rights and obligations of the previous employer.
Nothing  else  in  the  employment  relationship  changes.  The
succeeding employer is also bound by the kind of work agreed in
the  employment  agreement and by the place of  performing  the
work. If an employer could not allocate the agreed work, it  is
up  to  the employer to negotiate a change. Only if an employee
did  not  agree to the change can, for example, dissolving  the
employment  relationship  be considered.  Until  that  time  an
obstacle to work on the para.t of the employer would exist. The
reason for dissolving the employment relationship is then  such
that the employee would be entitled to severance pay.
  The group of senators, in response to the position statements
of  the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, emphasizes that the
reform  introduced  by  the  Act  does  not  strengthen   self-
government,  as  it  concerns the transfer of  functions  under
transferred  jurisdiction. It also rejects the  Senate's  claim
that  agreement  is  always a condition for  re-assignment.  It
points  out that the houses of Para.liament have not adequately
addressed  the  question of a statutory basis for  setting  the
numbers and rules for re-assignment of employees to territorial
self-governing units or administrative offices, and  it  points
out  the  existing  conflicts between  municipalities  and  the
terminated  district offices. The group of  senators  considers
the  para.allel  with  labor  law  to  be  inadequate  in  many
respects.  Concerning the Minister of the Interior's  assurance
that  the  transfer of employees to territorial  self-governing
units will be financially secured, which contributed to the Act
being  passed,  the  group of senators stresses  that  no  such
entitlements  arise from the Act, and that  financing  of  this
transfer is governed only by a government resolution, and  only
for 2003.

III.
The  petition  to annul individual provisions of  the  Act  was
filed  by  a group of 20 senators, as an authorized petitioner.
Because no reason to reject the petition and no reason to  stop
the proceedings came to light in the course of the proceedings,
the Constitutional Court discussed the petition and decided  on
it (§ 68 para.. 1 of the Act on the Constitutional Court).

IV.
The Constitutional Court then considered the matter under §  68
para..  2  of  the Constitutional Court Act. The Constitutional
Court verified that the Act whose provisions are proposed to be
annulled  was  duly discussed and approved by  both  houses  of
Para.liament,  was  signed  by the  appropriate  constitutional
representatives, and promulgated in the Collection of Laws, and
it  stated that the Act was passed and issued within the bounds
of   constitutionally   provided   jurisdiction   and   in    a
constitutionally prescribed manner.
   The  Constitutional Court then evaluated the content of  the
contested  provisions of the Act in terms of their  consistency
with  constitutional  laws and international  agreements  under
Art. 10 of the Constitution.
    The  objections  of  the  group  of  senators  against  the
authorization of the Ministry of the Interior for authoritative
re-assignment of employees from terminated district offices  to
the  offices  or  regions, cities and  municipalities,  can  be
divided  into three most fundamental and important ones:  1.  a
reference  to violation of the right to self-government,  2.  a
reservation  about  the  forced  nature  of  the  labor  of   a
compulsorily re-assigned employee and 3. notice of the  unclear
and  legally insufficiently supported manner of deciding on re-
assignment.

V.
The   guarantee   of   territorial   self-government   in   the
Constitution is laconic. Alongside the differentiation  of  the
local   and  regional  levels  of  self-government  (Art.   99)
territorial  self-government is conceived as  the  right  of  a
territorial   association  of  citizens,   arising   from   its
characteristics  and  abilities, as  the  Constitutional  Court
stated in its finding of 19 November 1996, file no. Pl. US 1/96
(Collection of Decisions of the Constitutional Court, volume 6,
p. 375).
   "The Constitutional Court considers local self-government to
be  an irreplaceable component in the development of democracy.
Local  self-government is an expression of  the  capability  of
local  bodies, within the bounds provided by law,  to  regulate
and govern para.t of public affairs on their own responsibility
and in the interest of the local population."
  The Constitution makes it possible to support this capability
by,  among other things, establishing the legal subject  status
of  territorial self-governing units, and presumes  that  self-
governing  units have their own property and manage  themselves
out  of  their  own budget (Art. 101 para.. 3). The  democratic
character   of  self-government  is  also  confirmed   at   the
constitutional level in the guarantee of elected representative
bodies  (Art. 101 para.. 1 and 2 and Art. 102). Of course,  the
Constitution  also presumes uniform state regulation  of  self-
government  in  a statutory framework. The definition  of  that
para.t  of public affairs which a local or regional association
of  citizens  is  capable  of  managing  is  entrusted  to  the
legislature,  i.e.  the  state power (Art.  104),  not  to  the
constitutional  framers,  who would  define  matters  of  local
significance  at  the  highest level. The  constitutions  of  a
number  of other European states also rely on the authorization
of  the  legislature to define matters of territorially limited
importance  which  are entrusted to territorial  self-governing
units.
   The  right  to  self-government generally expressed  by  the
Constitution  certainly may not be depleted by the legislature,
but  it  is  certain  that the legislature has  wide  space  to
determine  which  affairs  are best managed  at  the  local  or
regional  level  without greater interference  by  the  central
state  power.  It  is difficult to determine in  advance,  non-
politically,  expressly  from legal,  economic,  political  and
other  points  of  view, which matters have local  or  regional
effect and therefore deserve to be taken out of the purview  of
the  central  power. Decision making about the jurisdiction  of
territorial self-government is always political.. Even  matters
of  clearly  local or regional character can acquire state-wide
significance,  for  example,  fundamental  human   rights   and
freedoms may be affected or consequences can be carried  across
the  borders  of the territorial self-governing association  of
residents,  which  is increasingly frequent in  an  environment
with a highly mobile population.
   It  can  not  be overlooked that the Constitution  expressly
presumes (Art. 105) that territorial self-governing units  will
share  in the exercise of state power on the basis of statutory
authorization. Such sharing of the exercise of state  power  of
course brings with it the subordination of self-governing units
to  state inspection, the purpose of which is to ensure quality
exercise   of  state  power.  This  subordination  must   also,
understandably,  be  based on statute. The constitutional  does
not   say   unambiguously  whether  the   exercise   of   state
administration  can be imposed upon territorial  self-governing
units  compulsorily, or whether it is possible to execute  such
statutory  transfer only on the basis of an  agreement  between
the state and the territorial self-governing unit. In light  of
the emphasis on self-government, the requirement of a consensus
would certainly appear stronger. On the other hand, however, it
is   evident  that  uniform  exercise  of  state  power   under
transferred jurisdiction by municipalities, cities, and regions
is  generally  accepted  in this country  and  has  never  been
disputed   as   incompatible  with  the  right  of  territorial
associations of citizens to self-government. Even the group  of
senators does not dispute it, as such, in its petition to annul
some provisions of Act no. 320/2002 Coll.
  The Czech constitutional standard of local self-government is
supplemented and enriched by a standard which arises  from  the
international  obligations of the Czech Republic,  namely  from
the  Charter  of Local Self-Government, agreed  on  15  October
1985,  which  entered into force for the Czech  Republic  on  1
September  1999, published in the Council of Europe  under  no.
122  ETS and in the Czech Republic under no. 181/1999 Coll. and
no. 369/1999 Coll.
  The Local Charter is not a classic agreement on human rights;
it  does not concern individuals, but associations of citizens,
and  it  establishes collective rights. The  idiosyncrasies  of
interpreting  and applying it follow from this.  The  rules  it
expresses,  which create the European standard of  local  self-
government,  can  only with difficulty be  self-executing.  The
European  standard of territorial self-government is  expressed
by qualities which a para.ty's self-governments are to exhibit,
or  rights  which  they  are to enjoy. The  para.ties  have  an
obligation  to  guarantee their territorial self-governments  a
certain  number of such rights determined by the Local Charter.
Rights guaranteed by the Local Charter to the territorial self-
governments of the para.ties are a framework. The Local Charter
itself,  in a number of provisions, presumes detailed  domestic
law  regulation  which surely represents  bounds  within  which
territorial self-government will apply. It definitely does  not
guarantee the full freedom of territorial self-government. That
is  not the European tradition. Statutes, or other regulations,
depending  on  the choice and tradition of the  para.ties,  may
define  in  detail the range of matters managed by  territorial
self-government,  including those which a  self-governing  unit
has  an  obligation to pursue, its organization, including  the
form  and  status  of  individual  bodies,  may  determine  the
framework  for  management,  and  may  allocate  property   and
financial resources. The Local Charter certainly does not  make
territorial self-governing units into sovereign bodies  similar
to states.
  The Local Charter is not equipped with strict instruments for
implementing   itself;  it  lacks  a  mechanism  for   handling
complaints  on  the  para.t of self-government  concerning  its
violation  on  the  para.t of states-para.ties,  let  alone  an
effective  targeted instrument for implement standards  against
states  which  are  really violating the  Local  Charter.  Only
political  instruments  are available; the  para.ties  have  an
obligation  to inform the Council of Europe on changes  in  the
legislative  framework  (Art.  14),  the  Council   of   Europe
prepara.es regular reports on the condition of territorial self-
government  and  bodies functioning within in  which  represent
territorial  self-government  and institutions  monitoring  the
condition  and  development of territorial  self-government  in
individual  members  states, first the Congress  of  Local  and
Regional   Authorities  of  Europe.  Nonetheless,   a   uniform
authoritative  interpretation of the provisions  of  the  Local
Charter  which  would  separa.ate cases  of  permissible  state
regulation  from  incompatible  regulation,  is  lacking.   The
recommendations of the bodies and institutions of  the  Council
of  Europe to states, vis-à-vis their legislation and  practice
concerning   territorial  self-government  have  only   limited
significance. Generally they do not rely on provisions  of  the
Local Charter.
   Of  course, the weakness of instruments for implementing the
Local  Charter  changes nothing about its binding  nature.  The
Local  Charter  is  not  a  mere  declaration;  it  is  a  true
international agreement, which binds the para.ties  to  it.  On
the  basis of a conception of the constitutional order that  is
broad and responsive to international law (Art. 112 para.. 1 in
connection  with  Art.  1  para.. 2  of  the  Constitution,  as
amended),  the Constitutional Court is authorized  to  evaluate
the  consistency of the Czech Act with international law  [Art.
87  para..  1  let.  a) of the Constitution, as  amended].  The
framework  nature of the Local Charter and the specific  nature
of  the  collective rights it expresses do not prevent it  from
being  used  as  a  measure  for the  abstract  review  of  the
constitutionality of statutes. However, one can not forget  its
general  character,  which  opens a wide  space  for  political
deliberation  of  the  legislature  of  a  state  para.ty  when
creating the relevant legislative framework. The Constitutional
Court  is  decidedly  not  called  upon  to  re-evaluate   this
political  step; it merely verifies whether the bounds  created
by the Local Charter were not exceeded.
   One can conclude from provisions of the Constitution and  of
the  Local  Charter that statutory limitations and instructions
for   the   application  of  territorial  self-government   are
permissible. In the aggregate, of course, these rules  can  not
remove  territorial  self-government  completely.  However,  an
individual regulation can be relatively strict and restrictive,
if there are important, justifiable reasons for this.
   The  Local  Charter does not contain express  provisions  on
transferring  the exercise of state power to territorial  self-
governing  units.  Certainly for that reason international  law
does  not  prohibit the Czech Republic from it,  but  excessive
burdening  of self-governing units with the exercise  of  state
administration  may  endanger  their  property  and   financial
independence.  Moreover, the extensive exercise of  transferred
jurisdiction  by  territorial self-government bodies  can  lead
their  officials  into a "schizophrenic" position,  where  they
must simultaneously take into account both the interests of the
territorial  association of persons and the  interests  of  the
state.  However, the Local Charter can not be read to  prohibit
the forced exercise of state administration by self-government.
In   connection   with   the  Czech   reform   of   territorial
administration,  the  Congress, in its recommendation  for  the
Czech   Republic,  no.  77  of  2000,  supported  strengthening
independent jurisdiction, among other things because this would
reduce  self-governing  units' dependence  on  the  state  when
exercising  transferred  jurisdiction.  Thus,  the  Council  of
Europe  is  aware of the problems which the transfer  of  state
power  to  self-governing units causes for  their  functioning.
However,  this  transfer was also one of the main  elements  of
decentralization in the Czech Republic implemented by reform of
public administration in 2000 (by Acts no. 128/2000 Coll.,  no.
129/2000 Coll. and no. 131/2000 Coll., on the Capital  City  of
Prague,   and  other  legal  regulations).  Thus,   only   with
difficulty  can  it be considered incompatible with  the  Local
Charter's main direction.
  The transfer of officials from terminated district offices is
related  to  the  transfer of the exercise of  state  power  to
regions  and selected cities and municipalities. Basically  the
entire  agenda entrusted to them is defined by Act no. 320/2002
Coll.  as  transferred jurisdiction. At the present time,  when
the  regional level of self-government is still being  created,
one can justifiably have doubts about the ability of regions to
immediately ensure the exercise of state power with  their  own
forces.  To  a  certain  extent  the  same  applies  to   newly
authorized cities and municipalities which, although they  have
existed for more than ten years, will understandable never have
as  extensive  and  specialized an expert  appara.atus  as  the
regions.   Therefore,   authoritative  re-assignment   can   be
understood as a transitional measure. A certain space is opened
to  regions  and  authorized cities and  municipalities  for  a
gradual  change of personnel, according to their aims,  through
reorganization, applying qualification requirements, and so on.
This  process  will  be subject to only limited  inspection  by
central  state  bodies, whose only purpose is  to  prevent  the
regions, cities, or municipalities from endangering or  failing
in   the   exercise  of  state  administration  in  transferred
jurisdiction.  Although permitting authoritative  re-assignment
by  Act  no. 320/2002 Coll. is a limitation on the autonomy  of
municipalities, cities and regions to determine the numbers  of
employees  of their municipal, city or regional office  [§  102
para.. 2 let. j) of the Act on Districts or § 59 para.. 1  let.
b)  of the Act on Regions], but it is a lawful limitation.  The
provision on authoritative re-assignment under Act no. 320/2002
Coll. functions in this regard as a lex specialis vis-à-vis the
cited provisions of statutes on territorial self-government.
   Authoritative  re-assignment is  a  turning  away  from  the
principle  of  the autonomy of local associations  (territorial
self-governing   units)  to  create  their  own  administrative
structures (Art. 6 para.. 1 of the Local Charter). In  view  of
the  idiosyncrasies indicated, this can hardly be considered  a
violation of the Local Charter. A new model of territorial self-
government  connected with the broad exercise of uniform  state
administration  is still being created in the  Czech  Republic.
The   wording   of   the  Local  Charter  is   reserved;   this
international  agreement  speaks of autonomy  defined  by  more
general statutory bounds.
   Authoritative  re-assignment of  officials  from  terminated
district   offices  to  regions  and  authorized   cities   and
municipalities does represent a certain interference  with  the
property  situation  of  the territorial  self-governing  unit;
municipalities, cities, and regions have legal  subject  status
separa.ate  from  the  state,  are  furnished  with  their  own
property,  and manage themselves under their own  budget  (Art.
101  para.. 3 of the Constitution). However, detailed statutory
regulation of the management of territorial self-government  is
permissible;   self-government  does  not   mean   that   local
associations  have  sovereignty  (Art.  101  para..  4  of  the
Constitution).
  Czech territorial self-government is not fully independent in
economic  management  in  other respects  as  well.  Taxes  are
collected uniformly in the territory of the entire state  under
state-wide legislation; only with some taxes and fees does  the
state,  by its legislation, permit the municipalities,  cities,
and  regions  to range within certain bounds in setting  rates.
The  state  also  determines  the manner  of  distributing  tax
revenues, today with a high degree of redistribution  [Act  no.
243/2000  Coll., on the Budgetary Allocation of  Revenues  from
Certain  Taxes to Territorial Self-governing Units and  Certain
State  Funds  (the Budgetary Allocation of Taxes  Act)].  Large
differences  in  the  property of regions, municipalities,  and
cities  also  resulted from the transfer  of  para.t  of  state
property  (Act  no.  172/1991 Coll., on the  Transfer  of  Some
Things   from  the  Czech  Republic  to  Municipalities).   The
management  of cities, municipalities, and regions is  markedly
influenced  by  the  subsidizing activities  of  central  state
bodies.  The  effect  of  investments  made  in  municipalities
directly  by the state on local or regional situations  is  not
negligible.  The compensation framework for office holders  and
employees  of territorial self-governing units is  also  state-
wide. The management of municipalities, cities, and regions  is
also  markedly influenced by the urgency and demands  of  needs
which they satisfy within their independent jurisdiction.
   Territorial self-government truly separa.ate from the  state
in  terms  of  property, compara.able perhaps with early  self-
government  in  the USA, does not exist in the Czech  Republic,
and   implementing  it  is  unimaginable  for   many   reasons.
Compara.able  statutory  definitions  and  limitations  of  the
functioning  and  securing of territorial self-governing  units
exist  in all European states. The Local Charter respects  this
fact  and  only provides principles for sources of  territorial
self-government; they are supposed to correspond to  the  tasks
of  territorial self-government (Art. 9 para.. 2) and they  are
to  be applied as loosely as possible where true self-governing
activity is concerned (Art. 9 para.. 1). The Local Charter does
not   mention   the   financing  of  the  exercise   of   state
administration by territorial self-government.
  The framework for financing territorial self-governing units,
just like the definition of their tasks, undoubtedly may not be
economical  but  lead  to their financial  collapse  (Art.  100
para.. 1 and Art. 101 of the Constitution, Art. 9 para.. 4  and
7  of  the Local Charter). Therefore, the view of authoritative
re-assignment and the functioning of re-assigned  employees  of
terminated  district offices within regions, authorized  cities
and  municipalities, in light of the Local Charter and  of  the
Constitution  must depend on the manner of state  financing  of
the  exercise  of transferred jurisdiction. The  present  legal
framework   is   not  quite  clear.  Individual   statutes   on
territorial  self-government count  on  contributions  for  the
exercise of state administration under transferred jurisdiction
(§  62  of  the Act on Districts, § 29 para.. 2 of the  Act  on
Regions, as amended by later regulations). This contribution is
decided  by the state executive branch (the government  of  the
Czech  Republic, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry  of
Finance).  The cited statutes do not formulate a more  detailed
directive  for determining the amount of the contribution,  and
there is also no outline of the procedures for negotiating this
amount  or  dispute resolution mechanisms. However,  the  terse
statutory  provisions on contributions can still be interpreted
in   a   manner   which  is  constitutional  and  conforms   to
international  law  so  that  they represent  a  guarantee  for
economically  incurred expenditures in the  exercise  of  state
administration under transferred jurisdiction.
   Therefore, the Constitutional Court intends to refrain  from
premature  interference. However, it would take  action  if  it
found  that  the amount of a contribution or circumstances  for
providing  it clearly did not correspond to the tasks  assigned
to a territorial self-governing unit. Insufficient financing of
the   exercise  of  state  power  in  transferred  jurisdiction
endangers  the  very existence of functional territorial  self-
government. Principles expressed by the Constitution and by the
Local  Charter  would thus be violated. However, more  detailed
legislative  regulation of the financing  of  the  exercise  of
state   administration  by  territorial  self-governing   units
appears desirable.

VI.
Evaluating  authoritative  re-assignment  of  district   office
employees  to  offices of territorial self-governing  units  by
decision of the Ministry of the Interior at the proposal of the
chairman  of the district office, in terms of the objection  of
impermissibility  of forced labor, can not be  done  without  a
reminder of other compara.able cases which our law permits.
  Automatic succession to the place of an employer takes place,
for example, upon the death of the previous employer, a natural
person,  where the heirs become the new employer  (taking  into
account  probate rules and the interests of the employee  as  a
creditor),  upon the merger of legal entities of  the  same  or
different types, upon the splitting of legal entities, upon the
sale  of a business or in connection with the bankruptcy of  an
employer.  A  change  in the management  or  membership  of  an
employer which is a business company or other legal entity  can
often be more significant than a formal change of employer.
   Undoubtedly the main reason for automatically preserving the
employment  relationship  in these  cases  is  to  protect  the
employee  from  the threat of unemployment. Some changes  occur
unexpectedly  and also immediately (the death of an  employer);
others  can be foreseen, but they take place relatively quickly
(the  sale  of  a business that is in trouble). Permitting  the
successor to the rights and obligations of the employer to  end
the  employment relationship would open room for abuse of  this
opportunity; an employer could implement many measures only  in
order to get rid of his employment law commitments.
   Another  reason for automatic preservation of the employment
relationship  in  these  cases  is  to  protect  the   property
interests  of  the  new employer, who is  usually  the  general
successor  in the legal relationships of the original employer.
The  immediate depara.ture of employees, who need not all agree
to   continue  the  employment  relationship,  could  cause  an
employer  not  insignificant  economic  damages  and  in   many
business  and  institutions there would also  be  a  danger  of
endangering  the interests of third para.ties –  customers  and
purchasers  of  goods and services – and  a  state  of  general
emergency also can not be ruled out.
   Understandably, the continuity of an employment relationship
with  a new employer is imaginable only if the other requisites
of  the employment relationship remain unchanged and correspond
to  the same conditions. This means primarily the kind of work,
compensation for it, the place of performance of work  or  time
conditions  (the duration of the employment relationship,  work
hours  and time of rest). Other working conditions are provided
compulsorily and remain unaffected by a change of employer; for
example, the rules for work safety.
   In  the event of a foreseeable and prepara.ed change on  the
para.t  of  the employer, in certain outlined cases  under  the
European standard, the law newly introduces certain obligations
of  the  current employer: to inform employees or consult  with
trade  unions.  However,  all this only  confirms  that  it  is
standard practice for an employee to be transferred to  another
employer  without his express consent, not only  in  the  Czech
Republic, but also in West European states.
   Transformation of the private and public sector in the Czech
Republic after 1990 was accompanied countless times by a change
in  the  legal  form of the employer. It is impossible  not  to
refer  to the extensive privatization of the Czech economy.  In
these  cases  the continuity of an employment relationship  was
never described as or understood to be the imposition of forced
labor. Authoritative re-assignment of state officials to  self-
government  units,  i.e. only within the sector  of  the  state
power,  is,  in  this regard, a change which, in  view  of  its
effects on the employee, is not among the most serious.
  The opportunity to refuse to work for a new employer is, with
regard   to  the  employer's  justified  interests,  adequately
ensured  by  the  employee's ability  to  give  notice  without
stating  a  reason, which is accompanied by the  obligation  to
work temporarily during a two month notice period. This can  be
considered proportionate, in view of the usual possibilities of
an ordinary employer to find new employees.
   The  employee's obligation to work during the notice  period
represents  a  certain "tax" on employees for  the  legislative
stabilization  of employment relationships by a  modern  social
state.  Under  these conditions the employer  also  deserves  a
certain stabilization in the area of employment relationships.
   The Constitutional Court has not yet expressed an opinion on
these  aspects  of  the  exercise of  employment  in  terms  of
fundamental rights under Art. 9 of the Charter. The case law of
the  European Court for Human Rights also does not support  the
position of the group of senators, in reflecting Art. 4 of  the
Convention, which prohibits slavery or forced labor.  Also,  no
authoritative  interpretation going against the model  foreseen
by  Act  no.  320/2002 Coll. is presented  in  this  regard  in
relation  to  the right to earn one's living in  freely  chosen
employment  under  Art.  1  para.. 2  of  the  European  Social
Charter. The Convention on Forced or Authoritative Labour  (no.
29)  of  the  International Labour Organization  (no.  506/1990
Coll.),  which  is  aimed at slavery and feudal  practices  and
obligatory  manorial labor can scarcely be seen as an  obstacle
to  this  model. Nor does a cursory foreign compara.ison  help.
The  German Constitutional Court has not, in any case cited  in
the   specialized  publications,  spoken  unfavorably  on   the
compara.able German legal framework.
    The   following   facts  can  be  stated   concerning   the
authoritative re-assignment of employees, officials of district
offices,  to  municipal, city, and regional offices,  which  is
prescribed by Act no. 320/2002 Coll.
   The kind of work performed remains the same or compara.able,
the  appropriate territorial self-governing unit steps into the
position  of  the  state as employer if  the  activity  of  the
employee  concerned is transferred to the jurisdiction  of  the
territorial   self-governing  unit.  Each   para.ticular   case
certainly  depends on how the kind of work is  defined  in  the
employment agreement. The need for a consensual change  in  the
kind  of  work  is  surely routine within the transfer  of  the
exercise of state administration.
  Payment conditions are preserved, and Act no. 143/1992 Coll.,
on  Salaries  and Compensation for Work Readiness in  Budgetary
and  Some  Other  Organizations  and  Bodies,  in  the  current
version, will continue to apply.
   In  view  of  the fact that regional offices  and  city  and
municipal    offices   are   usually   located   in   different
municipalities and cities than the terminated district offices,
it  will  be  common for bureaucrats to move. In all  cases  of
authoritative  re-assignment to  a  workplace  in  a  different
municipality,  an  agreement  on  a  change  in  the  place  of
performance  of work after 1 January 2003 is necessary  between
the  bureaucrat  of  the  district office  assigned  to  handle
employment law relationships and the relevant employee.
   A  district office employee who rejects his re-assignment to
an   authorized  territorial  self-governing  unit  could  have
prevented  it  by  giving timely notice of termination  of  his
employment  relationship.  The final schedule  for  termination
district offices has been known half a year in advance, and the
reform  of  the  decentralized exercise of state administration
has  been  under  prepara.ation even longer.  In  view  of  the
qualification  of the employees concerned, the  bureaucrats  of
district  offices, and in view of the role of district  offices
in  implementing the reform, one can not agree that  they  have
been  insufficiently informed about changes which  will  affect
them personally.
   The authoritative re-assignment of district office employees
in  practice  is  described by the Ministry of  the  Interior's
Method  Instruction for the Implementation of the  Transfer  of
Employees  of  District  Office to  Territorial  Self-Governing
Units  of 9 July 2002, which expects that some of the employees
of  terminated  district offices will refuse to transfer  to  a
territorial  self-governing unit  in  view  of  the  change  of
workplace, and concludes that in such cases it is possible  for
the  district office as employer to give termination notice  on
grounds  of  redundancy  caused by organization  changes.  This
Instruction  also takes into account the need for a  change  in
the kind of work performed, and emphasizes the necessity of  an
agreement between the employee and employer. In the absence  of
agreement  there  is  here too the possibility  of  termination
notice  given  to  an  employee on grounds of  redundancy.  For
internal  purposes  the Ministry of the  Interior  selected  an
interpretation of the relevant provisions of Act  no.  320/2002
Coll.  that  protects  the  position  of  the  bureaucrats   in
terminated   district  offices  above  the  constitutional   or
international standard, which can only be welcomed.

VII.
Objections  concerning the failure to observe legal form  point
out  the brevity of provisions of Act no. 320/2002 Coll., which
do  not expressly answer every question. For example, it is not
evident to what extent, if at all, the Ministry of the Interior
is  bound  by  the proposal from the chairman of  a  terminated
district  office and the recommendation of the  director  of  a
regional  office. An indication of how to resolve disagreements
between    the   chairman's   proposal   and   the   director's
recommendation  is  also lacking. The  tasks  of  the  regional
office  director and the expectations to which he is  subjected
are not easy; the director is supposed to simultaneously defend
the  interests of the region and the interests of the state  in
the exercise of state power by the region and in inspection  of
municipalities and cities in their exercise of state power.
   The  nature of individual decisions by the Ministry  on  the
authoritative   re-assignment  of  employees  from   terminated
district  offices  to  regions, cities and municipalities  also
appears   to  be  disputed.  The  decisions  –  whether   taken
collectively  for entire districts or regions  or  separa.ately
for  individual  depara.tments  and  divisions  and  individual
cities  or  municipalities  –  can  best  be  characterized  as
collected legal acts; however, they are not normative acts,  as
they  regulate  the legal relationships of precisely  specified
natural   persons  (the  re-assigned  bureaucrats)  and   legal
entities  (the  appropriate  regions,  authorized  cities   and
municipalities). The source of law remains solely provisions of
Act no. 320/2002 Coll.
   Act  no. 320/2002 Coll. does not provide more precise  rules
for  how  to  take into account agreements under point  3  when
prepara.ing   and   issuing  decisions  on  authoritative   re-
assignment.  It  is  evident  that authoritative  re-assignment
would  occur  anyway,  in an extent which  corresponds  to  the
number  of  functions  transferred,  without  regard  to   such
consensus.   Nevertheless,   the  legislature   made   possible
agreements between the employee, the state (represented by  the
district  office)  and  a territorial self-governing  unit.  It
thereby opened room to apply the solution which best suits  the
para.ties.  In  view of the previously evident  extent  of  the
transfer of the exercise of state administration to territorial
self-governing units, there are no grounds for concern  that  a
territorial  self-governing  unit  which  was  forthcoming   in
concluding re-assignment agreements would remain disadvantaged.
   There  is a danger of inequality perhaps in those  cases  of
authoritative  re-assignment where functions  are  divided  not
according   to  the  population  density  of  the  administered
territory,   but  according  to  the  idiosyncrasies   of   its
territory,   population,  economy  and  cultural   and   social
situation. The projection of these facts need not always  fully
correspond  to  social needs, and then there  is  a  danger  of
inequality   arising  between  individual   territorial   self-
governing  units.  However, the interference requested  of  the
Constitutional  Court  out  of  fear  of  such  cases   appears
premature and exaggerated.
   A decision on authoritative re-assignment is reviewable by a
court.   As   a   decision  by  a  body   of   state   (public)
administration,   which  decides  on   the   entitlements   and
obligations  of  subjects  of  law (the  affected  bureaucrats,
employees, and appropriate regions, cities and municipalities),
it  is subject to judicial review under Art. 36 para.. 2 of the
Charter,  as  neither  Act no. 320/2002  Coll.  nor  any  other
statute  expressly  excludes a decision of  the  Ministry  from
judicial  review. In view of the probable effect on fundamental
rights  and  freedoms  and  fundamental  principles  of   state
organization,  such exclusion would evidently  be  inconsistent
with the Charter and the Constitution.

VIII.
After  reviewing the case at issue and analyzing the matter  in
terms of the conformity of provisions of Act no. 320/2002 Coll.
with   the  constitutional  order,  the  Constitutional   Court
concluded that authoritative assigning of the exercise of state
power  to  territorial self-governing units  arising  from  the
contested  provisions, including the re-assignment of employees
is  compatible with the Constitution. The manner  of  financing
the  exercise  of  state  power by  territorial  self-governing
units,   assuming   that   the  state  contribution   will   be
sufficiently  high for the performance of the  assigned  tasks,
does not represent a danger to the autonomy of territorial self-
governing units under the Constitution and the Charter of Local
Self-Government. The authoritative re-assignment  of  employees
from  terminated  district offices can not be  seen  as  forced
labor.  The  legal  instruments  introduced  into  the  law  in
connection  with  the termination of district offices  and  the
transfer  of the exercise of state administration to authorized
bodies of territorial self-governing units are acceptable  from
a constitutional viewpoint.
   The contested provisions of Act no. 320/2002 Coll. were  not
found  inconsistent  with  the  constitutional  order,  as   is
required for making a finding of derogation by Art. 87 para.. 1
let.  a)  of the Constitution of the Czech Republic no.  1/1993
Coll., as amended by constitutional Act no. 395/2001 Coll., and
therefore the Constitutional Court denied the petition from the
group of senators to annul points 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 11  Art.
CXVII of Act no. 320/2002 Coll., Amending and Repealing Certain
Acts  in  Connection  with Ending the  Activities  of  District
Offices,  under  § 70 para.. 2 of the Act on the Constitutional
Court.

Notice:  Decisions  of  the Constitutional  Court  can  not  be
appealed.

Brno, 5 February 2003