Pl. ÚS 21/01

The Constitutional Court refers to the legal proposition it has
already  declared,  to  the effect that  the  provisions  of  a
statute  which amend some other statutes become a part  of  the
amended  statutes (ruling of 15 August 2000, file  no.  Pl.  ÚS
25/2000,  The  Collection  of  Judgments  and  Rulings  of  the
Constitutional Court, Vol. 19, p. 271 and following; similarly,
see  judgment  of 13 March 2001, file no. Pl. ÚS 51/2000,  id.,
Vol.  21, p. 369, promulgated under No. 128/2001 Coll.) and  no
longer constitute an separate part of the Czech Republic  legal
order.

     It is the Constitutional Court’s task in the given case to
adjudge the issue whether the Senate was, or was not, empowered
to  hold  debate upon and approve also the amendments  to  acts
other than an act on the State budget, although accomplished by
a  single  vote.   A positive response must  be  given  to  the
question  as  framed in this manner; in the opposite  case,  it
could  after all result in the situation that by attaching  the
amendment  to  an act on the State budget to an  amendment  (or
even  the  adoption  of)  further acts,  the  Senate  would  be
excluded  from  the legislative process with respect  to  these
further acts.  Such an interpretation clearly would not  be  in
keeping  with  the  sense either of Art.  42  para.  2  of  the
Constitution or of the essence of bicameralism, as enshrined in
the Czech Republic’s constitutional order, and therefore it  is
necessary to consider it as an interpretation in conflict  with
the constitution.

     In  the given case, however, what occurred is that several
statutes  were simultaneously amended by a single statute,  and
among  these  amended statutes was an Act on the State  Budget.
It  should be added that the practice by which several  diverse
statutes are simultaneously amended by the adoption of a single
act  is  a relatively common one in legislative practice.   The
Constitutional  Court states in relation  thereto  that,  on  a
general  level,  this practice is in principle constitutionally
conforming, but only in the case that the amended statutes bear
mutual  substantive  connection to each other.   On  the  other
hand,  the  situation where several statutes bearing no  direct
substantive  connection to each other are amended by  a  single
act,  must be designated as an undesirable phenomena,  and  one
not   corresponding  to  the  purpose  and  principles  of  the
legislative  process.   Such  a  situation  comes  about,   for
example, due to the speeding up of the legislative process,  in
part in the form of submitted proposed amendments.

     Such a manner of proceeding, thus, does not correspond  to
the  basic principles of a law-based State, among which  belong
the   principle   that   laws   should   be   foreseeable   and
comprehensible, and the principle that it should be  internally
consistent.   If  then  the substantive  content  regulated  in
several statutes is affected by a single statute (in the formal
sense),  and these affected statutes do not, either by  content
or  systemic  considerations, have  any  connection  with  each
other,  then a quite murky legal situation immediately  emerges
which  does  not  respect  the  principles  of  foreseeability,
comprehensibility or internal consistency.

     Since the Constitution in relation to an Act on the  State
Budget  does  not  enable  the Senate  to  intervene  into  the
legislative  process  and this act,  on  the  proposal  of  the
government, can be debated and adopted only by the  Chamber  of
Deputies, it is evident that the sole possible constitutionally
conforming means of proceeding is that in which such an act  is
debated and adopted entirely separately.  For this reason  also
§ 101 para. 3 of the Standing Orders of the Chamber of Deputies
(Act  No. 90/1995 Coll., on the Standing Orders of the  Chamber
of  Deputies)  explicitly provides that  “Provisions  amending,
supplementing, or repealing provisions of other  acts  may  not
form  a part of an Act on the State Budget.”  (Note bene:    Of
course,  Act No. 10/1993 Sb was adopted before the  cited  act,
No.  90/1995  Coll.  came into effect).  In the  Constitutional
Court’s  view,  it  can be deduced from  the  wording  of  this
statute that neither can provisions amending, supplementing, or
repealing provisions of an Act on the State Budget form a  part
of  an “ordinary” statute.  The situation where, together  with
an  Act  on the State Budget, other acts are also proposed,  or
when  an  Act on the State Budget as well as further  acts  are
amended by means of a single act, is thus a situation which, as
was  already  stated,  is  not in conformity  either  with  the
Constitution or with the law (see cited Act No. 90/1995 Coll.).

     Thus,  the  Constitutional Court  acts,  in  norm  control
proceedings,  in  its  capacity as  a  “negative  legislature”,
authorized  in the case that it grants the petition  solely  to
derogate  the contested legal enactment.  For this reason,  the
annulment  of a contested enactment can also result exclusively
in  its "exclusion" from the Czech Republic's legal order,  but
never  in the actual creation of new regulation in the form  of
the  "revival"  of an already repealed enactment.   It  is  the
Constitutional Court’s conviction that the opposite view  could
give  rise to a significant degree of legal uncertainty and  to
the  Constitutional Court exceeding the bounds of  its  defined
competencies.  It can therefore be concluded that the “revival”
of   an   earlier  repealed  or  amended  legal  enactment   in
consequence   of  a  Constitutional  Court  judgment   in   the
considered  sense,  could come about  only  in  the  case  that
constitutional  provisions were directly to  make  it  possible
(see,   for   example,  Art.  40  para.  6  of   the   Austrian
Constitution).

     Since it is exclusively the Chamber of Deputies which  can
hold  debate upon and approve an Act on the State Budget,  such
an  act is adopted as soon as it is approved by the Chamber  of
Deputies, that is, entirely independent of any possible further
debate and approval in the Senate.  If together with an Act  on
the   State   Budget   (or  the  amendment   thereof)   another
("ordinary") statute (statutes), or the amendments thereto,  be
debated  and  approved - which would, however, be  in  conflict
with  the Act on the Standing Orders of the Chamber of Deputies
- such a situation must be interpreted such that the Senate may
hold  debate  upon and approve solely "ordinary"  statutes  and
amendments  thereto,  and  its  decision  has  therefore  legal
significance only in the case of those statutes, not however in
the case of acts on the state budget.

     If  then Art. 42 para. 2 of the Constitution speaks of “an
act on the State budget”, this term must be conceived not in  a
formal,  rather in a substantive, sense.  In other  words,  not
every statute designated as a budgetary act (or not every  part
thereof)  need directly concern the issue of the State  budget,
and  conversely  it is possible to imagine the situation  where
the content of an act on the State budget will be regulated  by
a statute which is not designated as such.

     In summary it can be said that when judging whether, in  a
specific  case, a bill can be considered an “act on  the  State
budget” under Art. 42 para. 2 of the Constitution, it does  not
suffice  to  limit  oneself  to  consideration  of  the  formal
designation of such a bill (statute).  Such an approach  would,
in  consequence, lead to the situation where the Senate  could,
in the case of certain important statutes, be excluded from the
legislative process simply by designating that bill an “act  on
the  State  budget”,  even  if in fact  that  statute  were  to
regulate  substance having no direct connection with the  State
budget.   On the other hand, the Constitutional Court considers
it  necessary  to emphasize that the substantive conception  of
the term, “act on State budget”, should not in practice lead to
too   broad  an  interpretation,  since  it  is  evident   that
practically   every  bill  is  related,  either   directly   or
indirectly, to the State budget, alone due to the fact that the
carrying  out  of that bill generally has impact on  the  State
budget  (either  in  terms of revenues or  expenditures).   The
term,  “act  on  the  State budget”,  must  be  interpreted  in
conformity with the normative regulation of the State’s  budget
rules  contained  in Czech National Council  Act  No.  576/1990
Coll.,  on the Rules for Managing Budgetary Funds of the  Czech
Republic   and  Municipalities  in  the  Czech  Republic   (the
Republic’s  Budgetary Rules), which were in force at  the  time
when  the cited Act No. 10/1993 Coll. and Act No. 217/2000 were
issued.   Pursuant  to  §  3 of Act No.  576/1990  Coll.  („The
Content of the Republic’s State Budget“) „The Republic’s  State
budget stall include expected revenues, as well as expenditures
in  ensuring  the  tasks and covering the needs  of  the  Czech
Republic  in  the given budgetary year.  It shall also  contain
financial  relations  to  the  budgets  of  municipalities,  of
district  offices  and to the budgets of the  Republic’s  State
funds.“   In  other words, the term, „act on State budget“,  in
its  substantive sense, must be interpreted in  such  a  manner
that  it  concerns such a statute as directly regulates planned
revenues  and  expenditures, the budget  items  of  the  public
sector of the Czech Republic connected with carrying out  State
functions  always for the following time period (that  is,  the
budgetary  year).  It is only a statute conceived in  this  way
that  must  be  classified  under  Art.  42  para.  2  of   the
Constitution, therefore it is only such a bill which the Senate
is not empowered to debate or adopt.

     The  Constitutional Court considers it desirable –  beyond
the  confines  of the case under consideration –  to  emphasize
that  the substantive conception of the term, act on the  State
budget,  in Art. 42 of the Constitution has further dimensions.
By  creating a special constitutional category of acts  on  the
State  budget, the Constituent Chamber emphasized  the  special
place  and significance these statutes have for the Czech legal
order, similarly as it did in the case of the electoral act  or
the  “relations”  act  under Art. 40 of the  Constitution.   By
removing  bills  on the State budget from the  regime  for  the
adoption  of “ordinary” bills, it expressed its intention  that
the  legislature considered the substance of the  State  budget
comprehensively  and  separate  from  matters  which  are   not
directly connected with the State budget.  In other words,  the
subject to be regulated contained in bills on the State  budget
can  be exclusively rules substantively related to problems  of
the State budget, not to other rules.  From the perspective  of
the  Constitution, it is impermissible to tack on to a bill  on
the  State  budget  a  provisions which in substance  bears  no
direct connection to the substance of the State budget.


The Plenum of the Constitutional Court decided in the matter of
the  petition of a group of 24 Senators proposing the annulment
of  "Act  No. 217/2000 Coll., a part thereof, or the amendments
to  acts  No.  1/1992 Coll. and No. 143/1992 Coll. effected  by
it",

                          as follows:
                               
            The petition is rejected on the merits.
                               
                               
                           Reasoning

                              I.

A.   The  submitted petition contests, in the first place,  Act
No.  217/2000  Coll.,  which amends Act No.  1/1992  Coll.,  on
Wages,  Compensation  for  Work  Standby  and  on  the  Average
Earnings,  as  amended  by  subsequent  enactments,  Act.   No.
143/1992  Coll.,  on Pay and Compensation for Work  Standby  in
Budgetary  and certain additional Organizations and Organs,  as
amended by subsequent enactments, Act No. 10/1993 Coll., on the
State  Budget of the Czech Republic for the Year 1993,  on  the
Amendment and Supplement of certain acts of the Czech  National
Council   and  certain  further  enactments,  as   amended   by
subsequent  enactments,  and Act No.  132/2000  Coll.,  on  the
Amendment to and Repeal of certain Acts related to the  Act  on
Regions,  Act  on Municipalities, the Act on District  Offices,
and  the  Act on the Capitol City of Prague.  The petition  was
submitted  on  the grounds that this Act (or at  least  a  part
thereof)  was  allegedly not adopted by  the  formally  correct
process  prescribed by the Constitution of the  Czech  Republic
(hereinafter "Constitution").

     The petitioners referred, first of all, to § 68 of Act No.
182/1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, according to which
the  constitutional  review  of  a  contested  statute  can  be
separated  into the scrutiny (I.) of its substantive conformity
with  constitutional acts and international treaties under Art.
10  of the Constitution and (II.) the constitutionality of  its
adoption  as  a statute.  The petitioners emphasize  that  they
does not wish to call into doubt the substantive conformity  of
the  contested act with super-statutory enactments, rather they
merely  consider  the manner in which it  was  approved  to  be
unconstitutional.

     The  petitioners  find  the  adoption  of  the  act  under
consideration to have been unconstitutional in the  sense  that
the  Senate  was  deprived  of the  possibility,  duly  and  in
conformity with the Constitution, to hold debate upon and adopt
resolutions concerning the bill.  According to Art. 42 para.  2
of  the  Constitution, only the Chamber of  Deputies  may  hold
debate upon and adopt resolutions concerning bills on the State
budget.  In such cases, therefore, the Senate may not take part
in the legislative process.  The same rule allegedly applies as
well  to  amendments  to acts on the State budget  (argument  a
maiori ad minus).

     In  the given case, the Senate received, as a part of  the
contested  act, a bill to amend a part of an act on  the  State
budget.  In such a situation, it had in principle three options
as to how it could proceed:

-   Not  to deal with the bill at all within the period  of  30
days.   While  this  clearly would have represented  the  least
controversial  means of proceeding (and for  that  reason,  the
Senate  elected  this option in the case of  Act  No.  362/1999
Coll.,  on  the  State Bond Program for the Defrayment  of  the
Deficit  in  the  State Budget for the  Year  1998  and  on  an
Amendment  to Act No. 530/1990 Coll., on Bonds, as subsequently
amended,  and on Act No. 22/1999 Coll., on the State Budget  of
the Czech Republic for the Year 1999), nonetheless allegedly it
could   lead   to  the  formation  of  some  sort   of   future
constitutional custom (precedent) where the sponsor of a  bill,
or  the  Chamber of Deputies itself, out of fear that a certain
bill  would  supposedly not be approved in  the  Senate,  would
attach  to  this  bill  a  bill  amending  the  formal  and  an
inessential  part of an act on the State budget,  and  by  this
means,  the  Senate would be "excluded from the  game"  in  the
context of the legislative process.

-   Adopt  a resolution to the effect that the Senate will  not
deal  with  the bill under consideration.  It must be  said  in
that  regard  that,  according to § 102  para.  1  of  Act  No.
107/1999  Coll.,  on  the Standing Orders of  the  Senate,  the
Senate  is  to proceed to a vote on this issue only  "following
the  conclusion of detailed debate" in the competent committee.
The concept, "detailed debate in committee" could be considered
as  "holding  debate  upon"  under  Art.  42  para.  2  of  the
Constitution  which, in the case of acts on the  State  budget,
accords  this  right solely to the Chamber  of  Deputies.   The
petitioners thus believe that, even if the Senate were to adopt
a  resolution  to the effect that it would not  deal  with  the
submitted bill at all, it would still have - in relation to  an
amendment   to  an  act  on  the  State  budget   -   committed
unconstitutional error, as it would have adopted  a  resolution
on  such an act, or even have held debate upon it, even  though
Art.  42  para. 2 of the Constitution provides that solely  the
Chamber  of  Deputies shall adopt resolutions and  hold  debate
upon bills on the State budget.  In this case, there would also
be  a genuine threat of "excluding the Senate from the game" in
the  context of the legislative process, as was stated  in  the
preceding point.

-   Adopt  the position on the matter to the effect that,  this
was  a  single  statute solely in the formal, but  not  in  the
actual,  sense  so  that  debate on  particular  parts  of  the
submitted  act  can be separated in the sense that  the  Senate
would  hold  debate on the entire bill with  the  exception  of
those  parts  concerning the act on the State budget.   In  the
petitioners'  view,  this option is merely  a  theoretical  one
since, in the case when several acts are amended simultaneously
by  a single statute, it is stricto sensu a single statute  and
neither the Constitution nor the Standing Orders of the  Senate
(compare § 98 and following) provide for the possibility of the
suggested "separation" of a submitted bill.

     Considering its need to give its views, in particular,  on
the  Act on Wages, in the end the Senate held debate on the Act
and  returned  it  to  the  Chamber of  Deputies  with  adopted
proposed amendments.

     The  petitioners consider that the situation  which  arose
when  the contested act was debated is not isolated and see  in
this  very fact the seriousness and genuine constitutional  law
intensity of the situation.  After all, the Chamber of Deputies
has already once, in the case of Act No. 362/1999 Coll., on the
State  Bond  Program for the Defrayment of the Deficit  in  the
State  Budget for the Year 1998 and on an Amendment to Act  No.
530/1990 Coll., on Bonds, as subsequently amended, and  on  Act
No.  22/1999  Coll., on the State Budget of the Czech  Republic
for  the  Year 1999, (chybí zákon 530/1990, 22/1999) given  its
assent  to  an act which, apart from the act on the State  bond
program and an amendment to the act on bonds, also consisted of
an amendment to an act on the State budget.  In the case of the
Act on the State Bond Program for the Defrayment of the Deficit
in  the  State  Budget  for  the Year  1998,  the  Senate  gave
preference to the solution of not dealing with the bill at all,
although  it  was  evident from the debate  that  the  Senators
feared  they  were  consciously violating the Constitution  and
also did not wish to give grounds for contesting the act - with
whose  content almost everybody was in agreement -  before  the
Constitutional  Court.   In  view of  the  situation  that  had
arisen,  the Senate therefore adopted a "mere" resolution  (No.
217  of  the  12th  meeting on 8 December 1999),  in  which  it
declared  that it had been "disabled from debating  the  bill",
and  protested against the Chamber's manner of proceeding.  The
evident  purpose  of  this  resolution  was  to  forestall  any
recurrence of a similar situation.

     The  petitioners consider that the legislative  procedure,
whereby  an act on the State budget also contains the amendment
of  further  acts  (or  the amendment to some  other  act  also
contains an amendment to an act on the State budget), could  be
designated as constitutionally conforming only in the case that
the  term, "statute", were conceived in the formal sense  as  a
legal  enactment debated and promulgated together with a common
text  and  under  a  single number in the Collection  of  Laws,
rather  than  in  a  purely material sense,  as  a  legal  norm
regulating  a certain field of legal problems with the  proviso
that  several  statutes, each individually  regulating  certain
substantive issues, can be debated together and designated as a
single statute under a single number in the Collection of Laws.
In  such a case, it would be possible to come to the conclusion
that,  in fact, the Senate in some manner held debate upon  and
adopted  resolutions concerning several parts of the  contested
act,  but not concerning the amendment to the act on the  State
budget.   The  term, "statute", under Arts. 41  to  48  of  the
Constitution should not represent a single act published  under
a single number in the Collection of Laws and debated together,
rather  a  statute  in the sense of a legal norm  regulating  a
certain  field of relations such that several statutes  can  be
published  under a single number.  The petitioners  nonetheless
consider  this  manner of interpretation as merely  theoretical
and   one   evidently  not  corresponding   to   the   existing
constitutional and statutory rules for the legislative process,
in the context of which it is entirely commonplace that several
statutes  are amended by a single legislative act,  nonetheless
from the formal perspective - thus, from the standpoint of  the
legislative  process as well - it is a single act, where  there
is  not  a  separate vote on individual amendments to  separate
acts, rather only on the act in its entirety.

    The petitioners therefore assert that, in the formal sense,
the  contested  act  is one statute as  a  whole,  even  if  it
effected  the  simultaneous amendment of several statutes,  and
since  one part thereof was an amendment to an act on the State
budget,  upon  which  the Senate is not  at  all  competent  to
decide,  as a whole this act was adopted in an unconstitutional
manner, which thus constitutes grounds for its annulment  (even
without any substantive review of the act).

     Nonetheless,  the  petitioners  do  not  exclude  such  an
interpretation as would proceed from the view that it was  only
the  act  on the State budget, and not the other acts  (or  the
partial   amendment   thereto),  which  was   amended   in   an
unconstitutional  manner, so that there would  be  grounds  for
annulment only in the case of the amendment to the act  on  the
State  budget, and not in the case of the amendments  to  other
acts.

     The  petitioners  assert that bills have  repeatedly  been
submitted  which,  in  a single text, amend  an  act  which  is
subject to consideration in the Senate and an act on the  State
budget,  which  can be debated exclusively by  the  Chamber  of
Deputies.   The  present practice was viewed by the  Senate  as
inappropriate, however, the Chamber of Deputies  has  continued
to  hold debate upon acts (proposed by the government)  in  the
above-described  manner.  In such a situation it  is  therefore
necessary  to  make  an  authoritative  judgment  -  from   the
perspective   of  the  constitutionality  of  the   legislative
process, as to whether the described practice of adopting  acts
is   correct,  and  further  to  declare  the  constitutionally
approved manner by which the Senate should proceed in the above-
described type of case.

     Since  the  petitioners are aware of  the  fact  that  the
Constitutional Court is not endowed with jurisdiction  to  give
an  authoritative  interpretation  of  the  Constitution,  they
consider it necessary for the Court to give its views  on  this
issue  in  the context of an abstract norm control  proceeding,
over  which  it has jurisdiction pursuant to Art. 87  para.  1,
let. a) and b) of the Constitution.


B)   The petitioners consider the adoption of the contested act
to have been unconstitutional in the following respects:
    
     *   Its conflict with Art. 42 para. 2 of the Constitution.
Only  the Chamber of Deputies is authorized to debate upon  and
approve Bills on the State budget, however in the case  of  the
contested  Act, it was debated and approved by  the  Senate  as
well, which the Constitution does not permit.
    
     *   Its conflict with Art. 33 para. 2 of the Constitution.
According  to  this provision, the Senate is not authorized  to
adopt  legislative measures concerning the State  budget.   The
petitioners  deduce from the example of this article  that,  if
the  Constituent Chamber did not enable it to adopt legislative
measures  even  in  the case the Chamber of Deputies  has  been
dissolved,  all the less can it be considered that  Senate  can
approve such bills in the case that the Chamber of Deputies  is
operating normally.
    
    *  Its conflict with Art. 1 and with Art. 15 para. 2 of the
Constitution.   According to Art. 1, the Czech  Republic  is  a
democratic State governed by the rule of law.  Art. 15 para.  2
of  the  Constitution  guarantees  bicameralism.   In  a  State
governed  by  the  rule of law, the principles of  bicameralism
correspond  first and foremost to a clear distribution  of  the
competencies between the two chambers of Parliament.  The state
of  affairs  where  the upper chamber is not permitted  by  the
express  terms  of  the Constitution to take  action  or  adopt
resolutions  concerning certain bills, is in  evident  conflict
with the situation which occurred in connection with the debate
on the contested Act, when the Senate was placed into the above-
described position, either ignore the bill as a whole and, as a
result,  consciously  give up its right to  take  part  in  the
legislative process when approving "ordinary" statutes,  or  to
take  action  on  it and vote, thus risking  that  the  act  be
adopted in an unconstitutional manner.

     In consideration of these arguments, the group of Senators
proposes that, in its judgment, the Constitutional Court  annul
as unconstitutional:
    
     1)   In  its entirety Act No. 217/2000 Coll., which amends
Act  No.  1/1992 Coll., on Wages, Compensation for Work Standby
and   on   the  Average  Earnings,  as  amended  by  subsequent
enactments,  Act.  No. 143/1992 Coll., on Pay and  Compensation
for   Work   Standby   in  Budgetary  and  certain   additional
Organizations and Organs, as amended by subsequent  enactments,
Act  No.  10/1993  Coll.,  on the State  Budget  of  the  Czech
Republic for the Year 1993, on the Amendment and Supplement  of
certain  acts of the Czech National Council and certain further
enactments,  as amended by subsequent enactments, and  Act  No.
132/2000 Coll., on the Amendment to and Repeal of certain  Acts
related  to the Act on Regions, Act on Municipalities, the  Act
on District Offices, and the Act on the Capitol City of Prague.
    
    Since, however, the petitioners are aware of the fact that,
at  the  moment  it  enters into effect, each  amendment  to  a
statute becomes a part of the amended statute and, thus, ceases
to  exist  legally, and since the Constitutional Court practice
is rather divided on this issue (for example, resolution Pl. ÚS
10/94,   Collection   of   Judgments   and   Rulings   of   the
Constitutional  Court,  vol. 3, p. 234,  and  judgment  Pl.  ÚS
33/97,   Collection   of   Judgments   and   Rulings   of   the
Constitutional Court, vol. 9, p. 399 and following, No. 30/1998
Coll.), then in consideration of procedural certainty (in order
to  avert  a  decision under § 67 para. 2 of  the  Act  on  the
Constitutional Court, that is, termination of the  proceeding),
they also proposed an "alternative petit", namely the annulment
of the following provisions:
    
     2) Sec. 2, § 4 para. 4, § 4 para. 5, the part of § 4 para.
6 reading „or the Labor Code“, § 4a, § 5, § 6 para. 1 and para.
2,  §  7,  § 8 para. 1, § 8 para. 4, § 10, § 11 para. 1,  §  11
para. 2, § 11 para. 3, the part of § 11 para. 6 reading „at his
own  expense and risk on one account of the employee at a bank,
a  branch  of  a  foreign bank or at a savings bank  or  credit
union,  at  the latest by the regular date for the  payment  of
wages,  unless  some other date is agreed in writing  with  the
employee“, § 11 para. 7, § 12, § 13 para. 3, the final sentence
of  § 14 para. 1, § 14 para. 2, the part of § 15 reading „20  %
of the average hourly wage rate for standby at the workplace or
10%  of the average hourly wage rate for standby away from  the
workplace“,  §  16,  §  17 para. 7, § 17  para.  9,  the  first
sentence of § 18 para. 1, § 18 para. 2, § 19, and § 22  of  Act
No.  1/1992  Coll., concerning wages, remuneration for  standby
and  concerning the average earnings.  Sec. 1, the part of §  2
reading  „employee“, § 3 para. 3 and 4, § 3 para. 5, § 3  para.
6,  § 4, the part of § 5 para. 1 reading „in the organizational
unit  of the state which is an administrative office“, the part
of  § 5 para. 1 reading „the Office of the Public Protector  of
Rights, the Office for the Protection of Personal Data“,  §  9,
in  the part of  § 10 para. 2 „in the amount of 150 hours in  a
calendar year“, § 11 para. 3, § 14, § 15 para. 1 let. b), § 16,
in  the  part of  § 17 para. 5 „at his own expense and risk  on
one  account of the employee at a bank, a branch of  a  foreign
bank or at a savings bank or credit union, at the latest by the
regular  date for the payment of wages, unless some other  date
is agreed in writing with the employee“, § 17 para. 6 and 7,  §
18,  §  19 para. 1 and 2, the first sentence of § 20, § 20a,  §
21, the second sentence of § 21a, § 22, § 22a, § 23 let. i),  §
23 para. 2, § 25 and the Annex to Act è. 143/1992 Coll., on Pay
and  Compensation  for  Work Standby in Budgetary  and  certain
additional  Organizations and Organs, as amended by  subsequent
enactments.
    
     3)   Part III of Act No. 217/2000 Coll., which amends  Act
No.  10/1993  Coll., on the State Budget of the Czech  Republic
for  the  Year 1993, on amendments and supplements  of  certain
Acts   of   the  Czech  National  Council  and  certain   other
provisions, as amended.


                              II.

      The   parties   to  the  proceeding  have  informed   the
Constitutional Court in writing that they assent to  dispensing
with an oral hearing.  The Constitutional Court decided that no
further  clarification of the matter cannot  be  expected  from
such a hearing and therefore dispensed with it (§ 44 para. 2 of
Act No. 182/1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court).


                             III.

     In  the sense of 68 para. 2 of Act No. 182/1993 Coll., the
Constitutional Court concerned itself, first of all,  with  the
manner  in  which  the contested Act, No. 217/2000  Coll.,  was
adopted and issued. . . .


                              IV.

     The  Constitutional  Court has found  that  the  submitted
petition  meets  all  statutory  procedural  requirements   and
prerequisites  and that there is, therefore, no  impediment  to
its  consideration and decision on the merits.  Therefore,  the
Constitutional Court requested, in the sense of § 69 of the Act
on the Constitutional Court, that the parties to the proceeding
-  the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Parliament  of
the Czech Republic - give their views on the petition.
. . . .

                              V.

     First  of  all,  the  Constitutional  Court  considers  it
necessary  in  the  matter at issue to define  the  manner  and
extent of constitutional law review.  In that it proceeds  from
the following considerations:

     1.   First and foremost, the Constitutional Court declares
that  the  petitioners did not explicitly call into  doubt  the
substantive merits of the contested act, rather only the manner
of   its  adoption,  and  since  the  Constitutional  Court  is
reputedly  not  empowered to give authoritative interpretations
of  the  Constitution, the question at issue must at  least  be
submitted  in  the  context of a norm control  proceeding.   In
these  circumstances,  therefore, in this  concrete  and  quite
specific case the Constitutional Court did not find any  reason
to  deal  with  the substantive essence of the  cited  act  and
turned  its  attention exclusively to the constitutionality  of
its  adoption,  albeit it applies on a general level  that  the
Court  is  bound  solely  by  the “petit”  of  a  norm  control
petition, and not its reasoning.  After all, in a norm  control
proceeding  pursuant  to  Art. 87  para.  1,  let.  a)  of  the
Constitution, the consideration of the constitutionality  of  a
contested legal enactment pursuant to § 68 para. 2 of  the  Act
on the Constitutional Court is divided into the adjudication of
an  statute’s  substantive conformity with constitutional  acts
and  international treaties under Art. 10 of  the  Constitution
and  the  ascertainment  of whether the contested  statute  was
adopted  and issued within the confines of the constitutionally
designated  competencies and in the constitutionally prescribed
manner.
    
    2.  The submitted petition (“petit”) is formulated by means
of alternatives, where – for reasons of procedural certainty  –
in  the  first alternative, the petitioners contested  Act  No.
217/2000  Coll. in its entirety, and also individual  parts  of
the  above-cited  acts, amended by Act No. 217/2000  Coll.   On
this  issue,  the  Constitutional Court  refers  to  the  legal
proposition  it  has already declared, to the effect  that  the
provisions of a statute which amend some other statutes  become
a  part of the amended statutes (ruling of 15 August 2000, file
no. Pl. ÚS 25/2000, The Collection of Judgments and Rulings  of
the  Constitutional  Court,  Vol. 19,  p.  271  and  following;
similarly,  see  judgment of 13 March 2001,  file  no.  Pl.  ÚS
51/2000,  id., Vol. 21, p. 369, promulgated under No.  128/2001
Coll.)  and no longer constitute an separate part of the  Czech
Republic  legal order.  The Constitutional Court was  therefore
obliged  to reject on the merits as not well-founded that  part
of  the  petit in which the petitioners contested the  amending
Act No. 217/2000 Coll. in its entirety, since the provisions of
this statute which amend other statutes have already ceased  to
be  a part of Act No. 217/2000 Coll.; it is only the provisions
of  Art. V (empowering the Prime Minister to proclaim the  full
and  current wording Act No. 1/1992 Coll. and Act No.  143/1992
Coll.)  and  Art. VI (governing the Act’s entry  into  effect),
which,  as  the  content of the petition makes clear,  are  not
proposed  for  annulment and which, in view  of  their  nature,
could not be annulled in any case.

     Thus,  the  Constitutional Court further concerned  itself
exclusively  with that part of the petition which  is  directed
against  the  individual provisions which amend the above-cited
statutes.

     3.  In  view of the submitted petition, the Constitutional
Court was obliged to adjudicate a further issue:  whether it is
justified to concern itself with all the amended provisions  of
Act  No. 1/1992 Coll., Act. No. 143/1992 Coll., Act No. 10/1993
Coll.  (Note bene: although Act No. 217/2000 Coll. also amended
Act  No.  132/2000  Coll., on the Amendment to  and  Repeal  of
certain   Acts   related  to  the  Act  on  Regions,   Act   on
Municipalities, the Act on District Offices, and the Act on the
Capitol  City  of  Prague,  nonetheless,  in  this  case,   the
amendment  consisted merely in a derogation of  Art.  II,  Part
Two,  so  that the petitioners did not even explicitly  propose
the  annulment  of a certain part of that Act), or  whether  it
would  be  appropriate  to  devote  attention  solely  to   the
amendment to Act No. 10/1993 Coll.  In this connection, we must
take  as  our  point  of  departure Art.  42  para.  2  of  the
Constitution,  according to which it is solely the  Chamber  of
Deputies  which shall, at a public meeting,  hold  debate  upon
and  adopt resolutions concerning bills on the State budget and
the  final State accounting.  In the present matter that  means
above all that, if the Senate held debate upon and approved the
bill for Act No. 217/2000 Coll., and if a part thereof was  the
amendment  to  four statutes, of which three  (Act  No.  1/1992
Coll., Act. No. 143/1992 Coll., Act No.  132/2000 Coll.) cannot
be  considered as acts which in the formal, or at least in  the
substantive, sense directly concern an act on the State budget,
then  with respect to these three amendments to the cited  acts
it  cannot  justifiably be asserted that  the  Senate  was  not
authorized  to share in deciding on them.  After  all,  such  a
position would be in clear conflict with the wording of Art. 42
para.  2  of  the Constitution.  The Constitutional Court  thus
reached the conclusion that, in the matter under consideration,
it  is  justified  to  limit the scope of its  enquiry  to  the
proposal  to annul the amended part of Act. No. 10/1993  Coll.,
and  not  the proposal to annul the amended provisions of  Acts
No.  1/1992 Coll. and No. 143/1992 Coll.  While the petitioners
were  undoubtedly  correct in their view that,  from  a  formal
perspective, Act No. 217/2000 Coll. represents a single statute
(albeit  one  amending several other statutes)  and  which  was
decided upon by the Senate by a single vote, nonetheless, it is
the  Constitutional Court’s task in the given case  to  adjudge
the issue whether the Senate was, or was not, empowered to hold
debate upon and approve also the amendments to acts other  than
an  act  on the State budget, although accomplished by a single
vote.   A  positive response must be given to the  question  as
framed  in  this manner; after all, in the opposite  case,  the
situation could come about, which the petitioners fear as well,
where  by attaching the amendment to an act on the State budget
to  an amendment to (or even the adoption of) further acts, the
Senate  would  be  excluded from the legislative  process  with
respect  to these further acts.  Such an interpretation clearly
would  not be in keeping with the sense either of Art. 42 para.
2  of  the  Constitution or of the essence of bicameralism,  as
enshrined  in  the Czech Republic’s constitutional  order,  and
therefore  it  is necessary to consider it as an interpretation
in conflict with the Constitution.

     The Constitutional Court was also obliged to reject on the
merits  as unfounded the second part of the alternative  petit,
as the Senate was empowered to hold debate upon and approve the
amendments to acts contained therein.

    The Constitutional Court therefore further concerned itself
solely  with  that  part of the petition directed  against  the
amendment  to Act No. 10/1993 Coll. which was effected  by  Act
No. 217/2000 Coll.


                              VI.

     The  Constitutional  Court found that,  in  deciding  this
matter,  it must, first and foremost, concern itself  with  the
interpretation  of  Article 42 para. 2 of the  Constitution  in
relation to the case at hand.  At the same time, it is  evident
that  any meaningful interpretation of the given article  would
be  possible  only in the context of the overall constitutional
framework of the legislative process as respects the competence
of the Senate of the Czech Parliament.
    
     1.  According to the Constitution, statutes can – from the
given perspective under review – be categorized into particular
types:  1)  those to which both the Chamber of Deputies and the
Senate must give their assent, whether by a qualified or  by  a
simple  majority  vote.  Constitutional  acts  fall  into  this
category,  as do the statutes enumerated in Article 40  of  the
Constitution, electoral acts, acts concerning the principles of
dealings   and   relations  of  both  chambers,  both   between
themselves and externally, or acts enacting the standing orders
for  the Senate.  (2.)  The second category of statutes is made
up  of the “ordinary statutes”, that is, statutes for which the
Senate’s  refusal  to  assent is “bridged”  (overridden)  by  a
further vote by the Chamber of Deputies.  A simple majority  of
Deputies  is  sufficient to adopt a bill  as  modified  by  the
proposed amendment approved by the Senate; an absolute majority
of  all  Deputies  is  needed in order to  adopt  the  original
version  of the bill (i.e., the version of the bill  which  was
submitted  to  the  Senate) (Art. 47 of the Constitution).   In
this  case,  then,  the Senate possesses  in  relation  to  the
Chamber  of Deputies the right of suspensive veto.   (3.)   The
third case is that of bills on the State budget (note bene: the
same  applies for a proposed final State accounting, which does
not,  however,  take the form of a statute) on which  only  the
Chamber of Deputies may hold debate and adopt resolutions (Art.
42 para. 2 of the Constitution).
    
     2.   The  Constitutional Court is not competent  to  judge
whether this constitutional arrangement is sound.  According to
Art.  88 para. 2 of the Constitution, the Constitutional  Court
Justices  are  bound  by  constitutional  acts,  so  that   the
Constitutional Court is not authorized to scrutinize (much less
annul) provisions contained in constitutional acts; its task is
solely  to interpret them in specified cases.  Even though  the
Constitutional Court is, in the given case, compelled to assert
that  the  conception by which the Senate is not authorized  to
share  in  the decision on State budget bills is quite uncommon
when  viewed in comparison to other democratic European  states
with a bicameral system, the Court has no option but to respect
this arrangement and, in conformity with it, also to assess the
existing practice.  (From the comparative perspective,  if  the
constitutions  of all European Union states are compared,  then
the upper chamber of parliament is excluded from co-decision on
State  budget  bills only in the case of Belgium  and  Austria,
whereas  in  France,  Ireland, Italy, the Federal  Republic  of
Germany,  the Netherlands, and Spain, the upper chamber  shares
in the adoption of acts of this type.)
    
    3.  As the State budget is the most important instrument of
State  policy  and also a reflection of the responsibility  the
government   bears  for  State  administration,  the   existing
constitutional  arrangement  in  the  Czech  Republic  for  the
adoption of acts on the State budget proceeds on the basis that
it  is  exclusively  the  government  which  may  submit  bills
therefor.   Since the Czech Republic’s constitutional system is
founded  on  the conception, among others, that supervision  of
the  government is solely within the domain of the  Chamber  of
Deputies, and not the Senate, the Constituent Chamber  selected
a solution by which the Chamber of Deputies possesses exclusive
authority  to  approve  an act on the State  budget  (see  also
above).    Thus,   according  to  the  existing  constitutional
arrangement, an act on the State budget is adopted  the  moment
it  is  approved by the Chamber of Deputies, and the Senate  is
not  competent  to  intervene into the  matter  in  any  manner
whatsoever.
    
     4.   In  the  given case, however, what occurred  is  that
several  statutes  were  simultaneously  amended  by  a  single
statute,  and among these amended statutes was an  act  on  the
State  budget.  It should be added that the practice  by  which
several  diverse  statutes are simultaneously  amended  by  the
adoption  of  a  single statute is a relatively common  one  in
legislative  practice.   The  Constitutional  Court  states  in
relation thereto that, on a general level, this practice is  in
principle  constitutionally conforming, but only  in  the  case
that the amended statutes bear mutual substantive connection to
each  other.   On the other hand, the situation  where  several
statutes bearing no direct substantive connection to each other
are  amended  by  a  single  act,  must  be  designated  as  an
undesirable phenomena, and one not corresponding to the purpose
and  principles of the legislative process.  Such  a  situation
comes  about,  for  example, due to  the  speeding  up  of  the
legislative  process,  in part by means of  submitted  proposed
amendments.  (As the most blatant such example can  clearly  be
given the adoption of Act No. 170/2001 Coll., on the State Bond
Program for the Settlement of Obligations arising from Treaties
among the Governments the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic,  and
the  Federal  Republic  of Germany, on amendments  to  Act  No.
407/2000  Coll.,  on  the State Bond Program  for  the  Partial
Defrayment  of the Damage suffered by Agricultural Subjects  in
the  Drought  of  2000, and on amendments to Act  No.  424/1991
Coll.,  on  Association  in  Political  Parties  and  Political
Movements,  as amended, into which the amendments  to  Act  No.
424/1991 Coll. were quite unsystematically included.)   Such  a
manner  of  proceeding, thus, does not correspond to the  basic
principles  of  a  law-based  State,  among  which  belong  the
principle  that  laws should be foreseeable and comprehensible,
and  the  principle that they should be internally  consistent.
If  then  the substantive content regulated in several statutes
is  affected  by  a single statute (in the formal  sense),  and
these  affected statutes do not, either by content or  systemic
considerations,  have any connection with each  other,  then  a
quite murky legal situation immediately emerges which does  not
respect the principles of foreseeability, comprehensibility  or
internal consistency.
    
     5.   Since  in relation to acts on the State  budget,  the
Constitution does not empower the Senate to intervene into  the
legislative  process and such an act, on the  proposal  of  the
government, can be debated and adopted only by the  Chamber  of
Deputies, it is evident that the sole possible constitutionally
conforming means of proceeding is that in which such an act  is
debated and adopted entirely separately.  For this reason  also
§ 101 para. 3 of the Standing Orders of the Chamber of Deputies
(Act  No. 90/1995 Coll., on the Standing Orders of the  Chamber
of  Deputies)  explicitly provides that  “Provisions  amending,
supplementing, or repealing provisions of other  acts  may  not
form  a part of an act on the State budget.”  (Note bene:    Of
course,  Act No. 10/1993 Sb was adopted before the  cited  act,
No.  90/1995  Coll.  came into effect).  In the  Constitutional
Court’s  view,  it  can be deduced from  the  wording  of  this
statute that neither can provisions amending, supplementing, or
repealing provisions of an act on the State budget form a  part
of  an “ordinary” statute.  The situation where, together  with
an  act  on the State budget, other acts are also proposed,  or
when  an  act on the State budget as well as further  acts  are
amended by means of a single act, is thus a situation which, as
was  already  stated,  is  not in conformity  either  with  the
Constitution or with the law (see cited Act No. 90/1995 Coll.).
    
     6.  For the sake of thoroughness, the Constitutional Court
states  that  an  act,  as  called  for  in  Art.  40  of   the
Constitution,  concerning  the  principles  of   dealings   and
relations  of  both  chambers,  both  between  themselves   and
externally,  make provision for the necessity of  independently
debating  and  deciding upon acts, for which  the  Constitution
lays   down   a   separate  legislative  procedure   (including
constitutional acts, see point V.1).


                             VII.

     1.   In  the  case under review, the Constitutional  Court
declares  first  and foremost that, although  Act  No.  10/1993
Coll.  was amended by Act No. 217/2000 Coll., nonetheless these
amendments consisted exclusively in the derogation of  §  6  of
Art.  V  para. 1, 3 and 4 of this Act and in the repeal of  the
designation  of paragraph 2 and paragraph 1.  In addition,  Act
No.  10/1993  Coll.,  is divided into two  relatively  separate
parts,  the  first  of  which  contains  the  heading  (and  in
substance  also  regulates)  “The State  Budget  of  the  Czech
Republic for the Year 1993”, whereas the second part, in  which
the  §  6 under consideration is found, begins with the heading
“The  Regulation of Pay and other Perquisites of Constitutional
Officials  and  other  Employees of  Central  Bodies  of  State
Administration  and other Bodies”.  Further parts  of  Act  No.
10/1993 Coll. concern other separate statutes which it amends.

    2.  In the first place, the Constitutional Court found that
not even the petitioners themselves indicated any provisions in
Act No. 10/1993 Coll. which they would wish annulled due to the
unconstitutional procedure used to adopt them or on substantive
grounds, even if - as follows from what was stated above - they
resist the amendments introduced into this act.  In fact, as  a
“technical  matter”  it  would not even  be  possible  in  this
specific case to annul certain parts of Act No. 10/1993  Coll.,
amended by Act No. 217/2000 Coll., since no provisions of  this
act  were  either supplemented or modified by Act No.  217/2000
Coll.,  rather they were merely repealed.  Since, however,  the
Constitutional  Court evaluates each petition in  view  of  its
content  and  not  merely  its form, it  was  obliged  in  this
specific  case  to  resolve the issue  of  what  would  be  the
consequences of granting the petition to annul Act No. 217/2000
Coll.,  to  the  extent it amended Act No. 10/1993  Coll.   The
Constitutional Court takes the legal view that by  annulling  a
statutory provision contested as unconstitutional, the previous
provision,  which  was  either  repealed  or  modified  by  the
unconstitutional  provisions,  is  not  revived.    Thus,   the
Constitutional Court acts, in norm control proceedings, in  its
capacity  as a “negative legislature”, authorized in  the  case
that  it  grants the petition solely to derogate the  contested
legal enactment.  For this reason, the annulment of a contested
enactment  can also result exclusively in its "exclusion"  from
the  Czech  Republic's legal order, but  never  in  the  actual
creation of new regulation in the form of the "revival"  of  an
already  repealed enactment.  It is the Constitutional  Court’s
conviction  that  the  opposite  view  could  give  rise  to  a
significant   degree   of   legal  uncertainty   and   to   the
Constitutional  Court  exceeding  the  bounds  of  its  defined
competencies.  It can therefore be concluded that the “revival”
of   an   earlier  repealed  or  amended  legal  enactment   in
consequence   of  a  Constitutional  Court  judgment   in   the
considered  sense,  could come about  only  in  the  case  that
constitutional  provisions were directly to  make  it  possible
(see,   for   example,  Art.  40  para.  6  of   the   Austrian
Constitution).

     3.   The  Constitutional  Court therefore  declares  that,
should  (in the given situation) certain provisions of Act  No.
10/1993  Coll. were approved by the Senate in a situation  when
the  Senate  was not authorized to debate and decide  upon  the
bill  -  logically it (the Constitutional Court) should  decide
upon  the proposition of law that this amendment is not capable
of  resulting in any legal consequences.  In other words, since
pursuant to Art. 42 para. 2 of the Constitution, the Senate  is
not  authorized to debate and approve acts on the State  budget
(argument a maiori ad minus nor to its amendment), any sort  of
dealing with the act must be understood as the intervention  of
a subject which is not authorized to do so at all.  Since it is
exclusively the Chamber of Deputies which can hold debate  upon
and  approve an act on the State budget, such an act is adopted
as  soon as it is approved by the Chamber of Deputies, that is,
entirely  independent  of  any  possible  further  debate   and
approval  in the Senate.  If together with an act on the  State
budget  (or the amendment thereof) another ("ordinary") statute
(statutes), or the amendments thereto, be debated and  approved
-  which  would, however, be in conflict with the  Act  on  the
Standing  Orders of the Chamber of Deputies - such a  situation
must  be interpreted such that the Senate may hold debate  upon
and  approve solely "ordinary" statutes and amendments thereto,
and  its decision has therefore legal significance only in  the
case of those statutes, not however in the case of acts on  the
State budget.

    4.  Nonetheless, in the matter under consideration, it is a
relevant  fact  that the amendments to Act No.  10/1993  Coll.,
concern  only  those parts which, by substance  and  systematic
arrangement, bear no direct relation to the issue of the  State
budget.  If then Art. 42 para. 2 of the Constitution speaks  of
“an  act on the State budget”, this term must be conceived  not
in  a  formal, rather in a substantive, sense.  In other words,
not  every statute designated as a budgetary act (or not  every
part  thereof)  need directly concern the issue  of  the  State
budget,  and conversely it is possible to imagine the situation
where  the  substance of an act on the State  budget  would  be
regulated  by a statute which is not designated  as  such.   In
support  of  this  view, a comparison  can  be  made  with  the
constitutions of certain other countries where the  term,  “act
on  State budget”, is also conceived in the substantive  sense,
as they clearly define what must be found in such an act.  Art.
51  para.  3  of  the Austrian Constitution  can  serve  as  an
example,  as it provides that “  A Federal financial  act  must
contain  proposed revenues and expenditures of  the  Federation
(federal  budget), allocated items for the coming budget  year,
as well as other essential requirements for the State budget in
the relevant budget year.”  At the same time, Art. 134 para.  2
of  the  Spanish  Constitution should be  referred  to,  as  it
provides that “the General Budgets of the State shall be of  an
annual character and shall include the totality of expenditures
and  revenues of the public sector of the State, containing the
amount  of  the fiscal benefits with affect the  taxes  of  the
State.”
    
    5.  In summary it can be said that when judging whether, in
a  specific case, a bill can be considered an “act on the State
budget” under Art. 42 para. 2 of the Constitution, it does  not
suffice  to  limit  oneself  to  consideration  of  the  formal
designation of such a bill (statute).  Such an approach  would,
in  consequence, lead to the situation where the Senate  could,
in the case of certain important statutes, be excluded from the
legislative process simply by designating that bill an “act  on
the  State  budget”,  even  if in fact  that  statute  were  to
regulate  substance having no direct connection with the  State
budget.   On the other hand, the Constitutional Court considers
it  necessary  to emphasize that the substantive conception  of
the term, “act on State budget”, should not in practice lead to
too   broad  an  interpretation,  since  it  is  evident   that
practically   every  bill  is  related,  either   directly   or
indirectly, to the State budget, alone due to the fact that the
carrying  out  of that bill generally has impact on  the  State
budget  (either  in  terms of revenues or  expenditures).   The
term,  “act  on  the  State budget”,  must  be  interpreted  in
conformity with the normative regulation of the State’s  budget
rules  contained  in Czech National Council  Act  No.  576/1990
Coll.,  on the Rules for Managing Budgetary Funds of the  Czech
Republic   and  Municipalities  in  the  Czech  Republic   (the
Republic’s  Budgetary Rules), which were in force at  the  time
when  the cited Act No. 10/1993 Coll. and Act No. 217/2000 were
issued.   Pursuant  to  §  3 of Act No.  576/1990  Coll.  („The
Content of the Republic’s State Budget“) „The Republic’s  State
budget stall include expected revenues, as well as expenditures
in  ensuring  the  tasks and covering the needs  of  the  Czech
Republic  in  the given budgetary year.  It shall also  contain
financial  relations  to  the  budgets  of  municipalities,  of
district  offices  and to the budgets of the  Republic’s  State
funds.“   In  other words, the term, „act on State budget“,  in
its  substantive sense, must be interpreted in  such  a  manner
that  it  concerns such a statute as directly regulates planned
revenues  and  expenditures, the budget  items  of  the  public
sector of the Czech Republic connected with carrying out  State
functions  always for the following time period (that  is,  the
budgetary  year).  It is only a statute conceived in  this  way
that  must  be  classified  under  Art.  42  para.  2  of   the
Constitution, therefore it is only such a bill which the Senate
is not empowered to debate or adopt.
    
     6.   The  Constitutional Court considers  it  desirable  –
beyond  the  confines  of  the case under  consideration  –  to
emphasize that the substantive conception of the term,  act  on
the  State  budget, in Art. 42 of the Constitution has  further
dimensions.   By creating a special constitutional category  of
acts  on  the State budget, the Constituent Chamber  emphasized
the  special place and significance these statutes have for the
Czech  legal  order, similarly as it did in  the  case  of  the
electoral  act  or the “relations” act under  Art.  40  of  the
Constitution.  By removing bills on the State budget  from  the
regime  for the adoption of “ordinary” bills, it expressed  its
intention  that the legislature consider the substance  of  the
State  budget comprehensively and separately from matters which
are  not  directly connected with the State budget.   In  other
words,  the subject to be regulated contained in bills  on  the
State budget can be exclusively rules substantively related  to
problems  of  the State budget, not to other rules.   From  the
perspective of the Constitution, it is impermissible to tack on
to  a  bill on the State budget a provisions which in substance
bears  no  direct  connection to the  substance  of  the  State
budget.   It  is possible to document such an approach  to  the
substantive  conception  of  an act  on  the  State  budget  by
reference, for example, to Art. 22 para. 1 the Constitution  of
the  Irish Republic provides:  “A Money Bill means a Bill which
contains  only  provisions dealing  with  all  or  any  of  the
following  matters, namely, the imposition,  repeal,  emission,
alteration  or regulation of taxation; the imposition  for  the
payment  of  debt  or other financial purposes  of  charges  on
public  moneys or the variation or repeal of any such  charges;
supply; the appropriation, receipt, custody, issue or audit  of
accounts of public money; the raising or guarantee of any  loan
or the repayment thereof; matters subordinate and incidental to
these matters or any of them.”
    
     At  this  juncture, it is necessary to  declare  that  the
fundamental  conclusion  reached by  the  Constitutional  Court
cannot  be  applied  to  the case under consideration,  as  the
procedure  used in adopting Act No. 10/1993 Coll. was concluded
before this Constitution became valid, so that it was conducted
according to the then valid Czechoslovak legal rules.

     7.   The  Constitutional Court has therefore  reached  the
conclusion that the contested intervention into the Act on  the
State  Budget  No. 10/1993 Coll. (formally designated  in  that
way),  carried  out  by the amending Act  No.  217/2000  Coll.,
clearly cannot be considered as an intervention into an act  on
the State budget in the substantive sense.  As results from the
text  referred to above - and as the parties to the  proceeding
correctly  stated  in their pleadings on  the  petition  -  the
substance  of  the special act, No. 10/1993 Coll.,  is  divided
into  two relatively separate parts, and the issue of the Czech
Republic  State budget for 1993 is directly regulated  only  in
the  first part; part two (§ 6 Art. V), which was derogated  in
part  by  the  contested  Act No. 217/2000  Coll.,  concerns  a
differing  issue (rules on the pay and perquisites  of  certain
leading employees and other civil servants).  Thus, the  Senate
did  not err in this case by debating in its entirety the  bill
for  Act  No. 217/2000 Coll. and by approving it - in a version
including proposed amendments.  The contested act amended  acts
No.  1/1992 Coll., No. 143/1992 Coll., and No. 132/2000  Coll.,
which cannot be considered as acts on the State budget, neither
formally  nor  in  substance, and the  amendments  to  Act  No.
10/1993  Coll. concerned only that separate part not  governing
the substance of the State budget.

     For  all  of  the given reasons, the Constitutional  Court
rejected  on  the  merits  and in it  entirety,  the  group  of
Senators petition as unfounded.


Notice:   A  decision of the Constitutional Court  may  not  be
appealed.

Brno, 12 February 2002