"Human Dignity"
I. US 453/03 - decided 11 November 2005 


HEADNOTES
All the agendas of state institutions, as well as the activity of persons active in public life, e.g. the 
activity of local and national politicians, officials, judges, attorneys, or candidates or trainees for 
these offices are a public matter; of course, the arts, including journalistic activities and show 
business, and everything which attracts public attention, are also a public matter. These public 
matters, or the public activities of individual persons, may be judged publicly. In constitutional 
terms, the criticism of public matters carried out by publicly active persons is subject to the 
presumption that the criticism is constitutional. This is the expression of a democratic principle, 
the expression of participation in public matters by members of a civil society.     
The presumption of constitutionality protects only an evaluative judgment, not the claiming of 
facts, which the critic himself must prove by evidence to the degree that they served as the basis 
for the criticism.
     Another general rule which can be derived from European case law is that if anyone wishes 
to publish information of a defamatory nature about someone else, his conduct can not be 
considered reasonable or legitimate unless he proves that he had reasonable grounds for relying 
on the truthfulness of the defamatory information which he disseminated, unless he proves that 
he took proper available steps to verify the truthfulness of that information, to a degree and in 
an intensity in which it was possible for him to verify the information, and finally, unless he 
himself had no grounds to believe that the information was untrue.
     The publication of such information also can not be considered reasonable if the disseminator 
of the information does not verify its truthfulness by inquiring of the person whom the 
information concerns, and does not also publish that person's position, with the exception where 
such steps are impossible or evidently unnecessary.
     To evaluate the legitimacy of publishing information it is important to examine the motive for 
its publication. It can not be concluded that publication of information was legitimate if the 
dominant motive for it was the desire to damage the defamed person, if the disseminator himself 
did not believe the information, or if he provided it irresponsibly, without due concern for 
whether it was or was not true.
     Honor is also an integral and important component of human dignity. It also forms the basis 
of many decisions made my members of a democratic society, which are fundamental for it to 
function well. Honor plays a role in relationships, such as whom an employer hires, or whom an 
employee wants to work for, it is decisive in decisions about who is to advance to higher 
employment or official positions; honor is important for deciding with whom to begin business 
relations or whom to vote for in political life. If honor is once sullied by an unsubstantiated 
accusation expressed publicly, and all the more so in the media, a person's reputation and honor 
can be damaged forever, and especially in a situation where there is no possibility of 
rehabilitation. If such a situation arises, both the person himself and the society lose. And it is 
precisely for that reason that one can not assume that protection of reputation, or honor, is an 
important matter only for the affected individual or his family. For these reasons the protection 
of reputation or honor must be seen as protection of a public good. Therefore, it is in the public 
interest for the honor and reputation of persons active in public life not be discussed at factually 
altered levels. Both in the field of politics and in the media a voter must be able to distinguish 
good from evil, so that he can in the end make an informed choice in relation to a politician and 
to the media.
     The fundamental right to honor is exercised in multiple spheres: the private sphere, the 
societal, civil and professional spheres; the last three can be described as the social sphere. The 
first sphere actually involves protection of privacy, where the right to honor is undoubtedly also 
applied. It is fundamentally up to each individual, what from that sphere, and to what extent, he 
will release as information for the outside world.
     The societal, civil and professional levels reflect the social nature of the fundamental rights, 
or reflect the fact that an individual lives in a society, and enters into communication with its 
other members, and through his conduct, or even through his very existence, influence other 
members of the society.

JUDGMENT
A Panel of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, composed of its Chairwoman Michaela 
Zidlicka, judge Eliska Wagnerova (Judge-Rapporteur) and Vlasta Formankova decided on 11 
November 2005 in the matter of a constitutional complaint filed by the complainant I. B., represented 
by JUDr. H. Ch., attorney, against a decision by the High Court in Prague of 6 December 2001, file 
no. 1 Co 147/2001, and a decision by the Supreme Court of the CR of 21 May 2003, file no. 28 Cdo 
1395/2002, with the participation of the High Court in Prague and the Supreme Court of the CR as 
parties to the proceedings, as follows:
     I. The decision of the High Court in Prague of 6 December 2001, file no. 1 Co 147/2001, and the 
decision of the Supreme Court of the CR of 21 May 2003, file no. 28 Cdo 1395/2002 violated the 
complainant's fundamental rights to preservation of his personal honor and good reputation 
guaranteed by Art. 10 par. 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.
     II. Therefore, these decisions are annulled.


REASONING

I.
In a constitutional complaint sent to the Constitutional Court by the deadline provided by Act no. 
182/1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by later regulations (the "Act on the 
Constitutional Court"), the complainant seeks the annulment of the decisions cited in the introduction 
because he believes that the decisions of the general courts violated his constitutionally guaranteed 
fundamental rights, specifically the right to personal honor and a good reputation under Art. 10 par. 1 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (the "Charter"), and the right to judicial 
protection under Art. 36 par. 1 of the Charter.
     In the decision cited in the introduction, the appeals court amended a decision by the City Court in 
Prague of 28 February 2001, file no. 37 C 115/99 - 100 by denying the complainant's complaint that 
the defendant (the secondary party, Ing. M. Z.) arrange the publication of an apology in the daily 
newspaper Mlada Fronta DNES within 15 days after the decision went into effect, with dimensions of 
at least 8.5 cm (two columns ) x 3 cm, in the editorial section of the newspaper, with the following 
wording: "I apologize to the journalist I. B. for untrue statements saying that he wrote at the order of 
Ceske energeticke zavody [Czech Energy Company], with whom he had a confidential agreement, and 
for accusing him of corruption" and that he pay the complainant CZK 300,000. The appeals court also 
awarded compensation of trial costs.
     The complainant filed an appeal against this decision, on which the Supreme Court of the CR ruled 
in the decision cited in the introduction, and denied under § 243b par. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code.
     In his constitutional complaint, the complainant states that, in his journalism he focuses primarily 
on ecological topics. The grounds for the above-mentioned court dispute were several verbal attacks 
by the secondary party, in the office of prime minister, against the complainant, which took place in 
the Chamber of Deputies on 29 June 1999, in a Ceska Televize [Czech Television] program on 30 
June 1999, in broadcasts on the station Cesky rozhlas - Radiozurnal on 3 July 1999, and at a press 
conference in the Lidovy dum [People's House] on 16 July 1999. According to the complainant, the 
secondary party expressly stated in the Chamber of Deputies, referring to testimony from the general 
manager of CEZ, Ing. C., this claim: "Since you constantly want some concrete evidence of corruption 
among journalists, let me give you some. There is a journalist named I. B. This journalist wrote for the 
magazine Reflex and may still write for it. This I. B. wrote articles in support of the completion of the 
Termelin nuclear power plant. There's nothing wrong with that, of course. I, as you well know, also 
support completion of that electric power plant. However, this I. B. had a confidential agreement with 
Ceske energeticke zavody, which means that he wrote at the order of Ceske energeticke zavody, and 
that's what I consider a form of corruption." In the Ceska televize program the secondary party 
allegedly added to that claim: "And if you'll allow me, you will be the first journalists whom I'll tell 
something which I have not yet had an opportunity to say. You know that yesterday I accused the 
editor I. B., who subsequently filed a criminal report against me, of being paid - in whatever manner - 
for his articles supporting the completion of the Temelin nuclear power plant, by the company CEZ. I 
know that the CEZ press secretary denied this report. Of course, I also know that about a month ago 
the general manager of CEZ, Mr. C., informed me that the agreement had been entered into, and that 
he had cancelled it. What does that indicate? In that case either the press secretary of CEZ is not 
telling the truth, or the general manager of CEZ is not telling the truth. And that alone is reason 
enough to investigate these matters, whether they concern foreign countries, whether they concern 
transportation, whether they concern energy, because corruption is terribly hard to prove." In the 
broadcast on Cesky rozhlas - Radiozurnal the secondary party allegedly said this: "I publicly give you 
the following information, that some time ago, about a month ago, I watched a TV program which I 
think is called "Nahrane," and that program contained discussions about Temelin. There, with Mr. B. 
present, an environmental activist accused him of writing articles supporting nuclear energy for CEZ, 
for CEZ's money. However, by coincidence, shortly afterwards, because he was invited to a 
government meeting about Temelin as an expert, I met with the new general manager of CEZ, Mr. C. 
And I told him: look, Mr. C., I support the completion of Temelin, but I heard in this program that Mr. 
B. is writing about you for your money, under an agreement. And I think that that isn't right, that 
everyone should promote himself through his opinions, not through corruption. Mr. C. then said to me, 
literally, and in the presence of witnesses: Mr. B. is not our employee, he only has a contract with us. I 
took note of that information. But allow me to continue. Mr. C. is now saying that he gave me 
erroneous information. He issued a statement to that effect. Fine, then I will tell you something else. A 
few weeks after that - and now, to tell the truth, I don't know where, it was at some reception where 
we met - the general manager, Mr. C., came to me and told me: I cancelled that contract with Mr. B. 
And I took note of that. And now I ask you both, because you're editors, a simple question: all right, I 
admit that I could be mistaken and that perhaps no such contract exists. To err is human. But can you 
cancel contracts that don't exist?" At a press conference in Lidovy dum, in response to a direct 
question from the complainant, whether there is evidence of his corruption, the secondary party 
answered: "The course of your case has been the following. Phase number one: in the TV program 
"Nadoraz" you were accused by an environmental activist of writing propaganda materials for CEZ 
for money. You were present at that program, and I don't want to elaborate on it now, because that 
was really phase number one. In other words, this accusation came from a different person, and 
publicly, even before coming from me. Phase number two: in the presence of witnesses I asked the 
general manager of CEZ, Mr. C., and said, although I support nuclear energy, just like you do, but I 
consider it somewhat immoral when your company pays for articles by journalists, if what was said in 
the program "Nahrane" is true. I can publicly say that the general manager of CEZ said: Mr. B. is not 
our employed, but he has a contract with us. And he said that in the presence of witnesses. And phrase 
number three, Mr. B.: shortly afterwards Mr. C. was in the presence of witnesses again at some 
reception in the Lichtenstejn Palace and informed me that he had cancelled the contract with you. So 
these are three absolutely clear arguments on which I rely."
     The complainant is aware that, just like politicians, so he too, as a journalist, is subject to 
heightened scrutiny, and must bear possible criticism for his opinions and positions; nonetheless, such 
criticism may not be untrue, or, with regard to character, a dishonoring accusation. Because the 
complainant considered the above-mentioned accusation of corruption to be considerable detriment, 
which endangered his honor and good reputation in professional circles and in society (and he didn't 
have long to wait for the consequences), he asked the general courts to protect his honor and dignity.
     The above-mentioned decision by the court of the first level granted the complainant's complaint, 
but that decision was then changed by decision of the appeals courts. The complainant criticizes the 
two appeals courts, saying that their decisions interfered in his fundamental right to personal honor 
and a good reputation, as well as in his right to a fair trial. The complainant argues that he is aware 
that criticism of an individual's conduct which is based on circumstances about which true information 
is given can not generally be considered inconsistent with § 11 of the Civil Code, even if the criticism 
used a corresponding measure of irony, condemnation and repudiation of the criticized conduct of the 
individual. In contrast, the use of criticism, irony, condemnation and rejection of the conduct or 
activity of an individual about which untrue information is given is generally palpable, unjustified 
interference in the individual's right to protection of his personality, and this involves considerable 
intensity of unjustified interference, which will usually have unfavorable consequences on the afflicted 
person's status. As the complainant says, the secondary party's accusation was the first accusation of 
corruption of a journalist by name, and it involved suspicion of corruption by an industrial concern, 
which, from the point of view of a journalist, is considered the worst. The complainant is afraid that he 
will be disadvantaged in any future expert dispute with environmental activists for this reason. The 
complainant specifically disagrees with the opinion of the appeals court which found the information 
about the corruption of the complainant to be true, because the secondary party obtained it from a 
trustworthy person. The complainant objects that the testimony before the court of the first level and 
before the appeals court was inconsistent on many points, and appears untrustworthy and self-serving. 
He certainly cannot agree that calling a journalist corrupt was actually the exercise of the right to 
criticize, which can not be subject to proof of truthfulness. Primarily, however, the complainant 
believes that the secondary party can not rid himself of responsibility by pointing out that the source of 
information is relevant. In his opinion, a mere reference to a relevant person can not be allowed to rid 
the bearer of a report of responsibility. Only if he is performing his reporting duties can it be allowed 
that, if he is conveying information about a particular event of public interest, the right to information 
and its dissemination can be given priority over protection of personality. And in cases of conflict 
between these rights it is the duty of the courts to weigh, taking into account the circumstances of each 
case, whether one right was not given unjustified priority over the other right. This case, however, did 
not concern the tradition conflict of the media and a politician, as usually happens in cases of conflict 
between the right to information and the right to protection of personality; instead, in the instant case 
the journalist was a "target" who unwillingly found himself in "a kind of long standing battle between 
journalists and politicians," and, moreover, was in an unequal position. The complainant also 
disagreed with the claim that the court evaluated the statements which followed the CEZ statement 
and which refuted the report of possible corruption or writing for pay as some kind of statement at the 
request of the media or the plaintiff. On the contrary, the complainant believes that these statements 
were an answer to questions related to the fact that both CEZ and its general manager denied the report 
of a contract, and the questions related to evidence of corruption. As regards the decision of the second 
appeals court, the complainant says that he expected that the Supreme Court of the CR would handle 
the objections which were set forth in the appeal on a point of law, which did not happen. Although 
the second appeals court itself said in the reasoning of its decision that the first appeals court did not 
have an easy task, it only repeated the case law applied and concluded, without justifying it, that the 
application of § 11 and § 13 of the Civil Code and the interpretation of them can not be considered 
inconsistent with the text of these provisions in the published case law of courts.
     In view of the foregoing, the complainant proposes that the Constitutional Court enter a judgment 
annulling both the decisions of the general courts cited in the introduction.
     On behalf of the party to the proceedings, the High court in Prague, the chairwoman of the panel, 
JUDr. N. Z., responded to the constitutional complaint; she said that she refers in full to the reasoning 
in the contested decision.
     On behalf of the Supreme Court of the CR, the chairman of the panel, JUDr. J. R., responded to the 
complainant's filing; he said that the constitutional complaint does not present any concrete criticism 
of the steps taken by the first and second appeals courts in the proceedings in terms of procedural 
regulations, or against the legal evaluation of the matter in the decisions of these courts, that would 
contain anything other than disagreement with the evaluation of the evidence admitted by the appeals 
court. Therefore, in terms of the application and interpretation of provisions of the Civil Code and the 
Civil Procedure Code by the first and second appeals courts in the instant case, the complainant's 
constitutional complaint can not be seen as justified. Evaluation in terms of constitutional law 
regulations is up to the Constitutional Court, as the panel chairman stated.
     The secondary party, Ing. M. Z., responded to the constitutional complaint to the effect that he 
relied on information from the then general manager of CEZ, and he regards the claim that he should 
have verified that information as absurd. He also stated that he subjectively believes that the 
information from the then general manager of CEZ was true. Of course, the Constitutional Court did 
not take this statement into account, because the secondary party was not represented by an attorney 
under § 30 par. 1 of the Act on the Constitutional Court.
     The Constitutional Court also determined from public sources that the Syndicate of Journalists of 
the Czech Republic prepared a Journalist's Ethical Codex, which it called on all Czech and Moravian 
journalists to observe voluntary, regardless of their membership in the Syndicate. Under Art. 1 let. i) 
of that document, a journalist is obligated to accept only assignments appropriate to his professional 
dignity, and under Art. 2 let. d) he is obligated not to misuse the profession of journalist for the work 
of an advertising worker and not to accept any direct or indirect compensation from potential 
advertisers. The Constitutional Court also determined form the Declaration of Principles of 
Journalistic Conduct, promulgated as a norm for professional conduct of journalists, which was 
approved at the 2nd world congress of the International Federation of Journalists in Bordeaux held on 
25-28 April 1954 and subsequently amended at the 18th world congress of the International Federation 
of Journalists in Helsingore held on 2-6 June 1986, that a journalist shall consider the acceptance of 
any form of bribe to be serious professional misconduct.
     
II.
The Constitutional Court determined the following information from the file no. 37 C 115/99:
     In 1999 the complainant wrote an article on nuclear energy for the magazine Reflex. Having been 
approached by the press secretary of CEZ, a.s. after the article's publication, he gave consent to CEZ 
using it for its needs, on the condition that it would be printed with an announcement that the article 
was being re-printed with the author's consent, without entitlement to payment (pp. 29, 64).
     In the television program "Nahrane" aired on 22 March 1999, the environmental activist J. B. said 
to the complainant: "You are not an objective journalist, because CEZ is printing your articles as a 
paid advertisement."
     On 12 May 1999 in the vestibule at the Office of the Government, the then general manager of 
CEZ, a.s. told the secondary party (then prime minister), in response to his express question, that CEZ 
did not employ journalists, and did not employ the complainant. If journalists worked for it, then it 
was "by contract" (pp. 50, 52).
     The next day the general manager issued an instruction to annul the contract with the complainant, 
based on the information from the prime minister, provided to him the day before, about the fact that 
CEZ was using the complainant's article, and being convinced, without having seen the actual 
publication of the article, that everything was being respected, i.e. convinced that a payment must have 
been made to the complainant on the basis of the contract with him (p. 50).
     A few weeks later, at an unspecified reception, the secondary party, the former prime minister, met 
with the former manager of CEZ, and the general manager of CEZ informed him about the above-
mentioned actions (pp. 30, 50, 52).
     On 28 June 1999, after a meeting of the government, a press conference was held at which the 
prime minister spoke about the corruption of journalists (p. 70) in connection with the presentation of 
politicians in the media. The then minister of foreign affairs, J.K., spoke on the same issue, directing 
his remarks at the person of the former minister of foreign affairs, J. Zieleniec. The journalists present 
criticized the members of the government for speaking of the accusations of ex-minister Zieleniec 
publicly without presenting evidence (p. 77). The prime minister said that he had received from the 
minister of foreign affairs a list of four media agencies which were alleged to represent J. Z.; at the 
same time, however, he said that he would disclose their names, in response to the request of J. K. 
only after J. K. met with J. Z., and would investigate the suspicion that excessive funds had been spent 
for the personal promotion of J. Z. J. K. presented a critique of J. Z. and his work, and informed the 
journalists that he was investigating the circumstances surrounding the selection of agencies for 
promoting foreign policy during the term of office of minister Z., as well as the reasons for their high 
fees (pp. 71, 72). The prime minister then closed the answers to the journalists by stating that he 
trusted the members of the government and their information, and unless he were to be convinced of 
the contrary, he had no reason to apologize to J. Z.
     On 29 June 1999, in the vestibule of the Chamber of Deputies, journalists again pressed the prime 
minister to disclose the list of agencies which were alleged to have created a better image of ex-
minister Z. for high fees, which he refused to do, although he did say that he would disclose a case of 
corruption of journalists. He then made the first statement now contested by the complainant (pp. 2, 8, 
9, 10, 14, 95, 96).
     Reports from CTK and internet dailies from that day contain the complainant's denial of the 
accusation of corrupt conduct. (P. 10).
     Media reports of 30 June 1999 concerning the secondary party's declaration of 29 June 1999, i.e. 
reports provided by the media the following day, contain a statement from the press secretary of CEZ, 
a.s. which says that the current management of the company had never paid the complainant and that 
there was nothing to suggest that the former management of CEZ, a.s. had done so. These reports also 
contain a statement from the general manager of CEZ, a.s. in which he stated with regret that he had 
informed the prime minister erroneously about the relationship between CEZ and the complainant, 
based on incomplete information, and he apologized to both gentlemen (pp. 11, 12, 15).
     On 30 June 1999 the secondary party basically repeated the contested statements in a program on 
CT [Czech Television], and added that he was aware of the denial given to the media by the press 
secretary of CEZ, a.s., and also said that about a month earlier the general manager of CEZ, a.s. had 
told him that the contract with the complainant had been entered into and that he had cancelled it. The 
secondary party concluded from the general manager's information that either the press secretary or 
the general manager of CEZ, a.s. was not telling the truth (p. 2).
     On 3 July 1999, in a panel discussion on Radiozurnal, the secondary party described the genesis of 
the contested statements from the TV program "Nahrane" after the general manager's denial, and 
added, "I admit that I could be mistaken, and that no such agreement existed; to err is human. But how 
can you cancel a contract that doesn't exist?" (p. 35).
     On 16 July 1999, in response to the complainant's question whether there was evidence of his 
corruption, which he raised at a press conference in the Lidovy dum, the secondary party basically 
repeated what he had said on 3 July 1999 on Radiozurnal, without, of course, adding the information 
about the press release of CEZ and the press lease of the general manager (p. 3).
     
III.
Before the Constitutional Court could turn to evaluation of the matter on the merits, it was required, in 
view of its own case law (III. US 28/96), consider the question whether the secondary party M. Z. 
(originally the defendant) even had passive standing in the original suit. After evaluating the matter, 
the Constitutional Court concluded that the secondary party did have passive standing in the original 
suit, and that the instant matter differs significantly from the above-mentioned decision of the 
Constitutional Court.
     The suit by the weekly Respekt against minister J. L. (the former minister of agriculture) concerned 
a refusal to provide information, which was contained in a letter signed by J. L. In denying the 
constitutional complaint, the Constitutional Court concluded, among other things, that the minister's 
letter must be considered to be a decision by an administrative body.
     The matter being addressed today differs significantly from the matter in file no. III. US 28/96. The 
minister's decision to not provide information fell within his ministerial jurisdiction as substantively 
defined by statute. Minister L. was thus acting in a matter which was within his jurisdiction. In 
contrast, the secondary party in the instant matter was prime minister of the government of the CR at 
the time when he made the contested statements, but the government, as a constitutional body, can not 
be assigned responsibility for these statements, because their content, i.e. giving information about the 
results of an investigation led by the prime minister himself concerning the complainant's alleged 
conduct and evaluation of that conduct in terms of criminal law is not, under any circumstances, a 
matter which falls within the jurisdiction of the government. The government does not have 
investigative authority at any of the levels in which it functions, i.e. not if it is performing political 
functions, nor if it is performing administrative functions. Therefore, if the government, or any 
member of it, or even the prime minister, obtains information on conduct which could be considered a 
crime, the government is not authorized to handle it, in the sense of investigating it, and it is even less 
so authorized to evaluate it legally and inform the public about its conclusions. If any member of the 
government commits such conduct, he is impermissibly stepping outside the bounds of his 
authorization as a member of the government, or even prime minister. Such conduct by a member of 
the government is conduct ultra vires in terms of jurisdiction; it is not binding on the government, and 
the government, as a body acting on behalf of the state, can not be held responsible for it. Therefore, 
the member of the government who commits such conduct is responsible for it as an individual - i.e., 
among other things, in a potential lawsuit for protection of personality he himself is a person with 
passive standing. This finding does not rule out taking into account, in further substantive evaluation 
of the case, precisely the fact that the contested statements were made by a member of the government, 
or even its prime minister, (see below).
     Because the constitutional complaint met all the formal requirements required by the Act on the 
Constitutional Court, the court could turn to substantive evaluation of it.

IV.
The subject of evaluation in the instant case is whether the general courts (the High Court and the 
Supreme Court) interfered in the complainant's fundamental right to preservation of his honor and 
good reputation (Art. 10 of the Charter) by, on the contrary, providing protection to the fundamental 
right to freedom of expression, to the benefit of the secondary party, the original defendant. 
     A) The fundamental right to freedom of expression must be considered a constitutive element of a 
democratic, pluralistic society, in which everyone is permitted to express his opinion on public matters 
and to make evaluative judgments about them.
     All the agendas of state institutions, as well as the activity of persons active in public life, e.g. the 
activity of local and national politicians, officials, judges, attorneys, or candidates or trainees for these 
offices are a public matter; of course, the arts, including journalistic activities and show business, and 
everything which attracts public attention, are also a public matter. These public matters, or the public 
activities of individual persons, may be judged publicly. In constitutional terms, the criticism of public 
matters carried out by publicly active persons is subject to the presumption that the criticism is 
constitutional. This is the expression of a democratic principle, the expression of participation in 
public matters by members of a civil society.
     The presumption of constitutionality protects only an evaluative judgment, not the claiming of 
facts, which the critic himself must prove by evidence to the degree that they served as the basis for 
the criticism.
     The requirement that the critic himself prove the claimed facts is a European constitutional standard 
(e.g. decision of the House of Lords of 28 October 1999 in the matter Reynolds v. Times News Papers 
Limited, or the decision of the German Constitutional Court (BVerfG) of 3 June 1980, 1 BvR 797/78 
in the case of Boll, which is also confirmed by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights - 
the ECHR - e.g. decision of the Grand Chamber of 17 December 2004 in the matter Pedersen and 
Badsgaard v. Denmark).
     Another general rule which can be derived from European case law is that if anyone wishes to 
publish information of a defamatory nature about someone else, his conduct can not be considered 
reasonable or legitimate unless he proves that he had reasonable grounds for relying on the 
truthfulness of the defamatory information which he disseminated, unless he proves that he took 
proper available steps to verify the truthfulness of that information, to a degree and in an intensity in 
which it was possible for him to verify the information, and finally, unless he himself had no grounds 
to believe that the information was untrue.
     The publication of such information also can not be considered reasonable if the disseminator of 
the information does not verify its truthfulness by inquiring of the person whom the information 
concerns, and does not also publish that person's position, with the exception where such steps are 
impossible or evidently unnecessary (see Reynolds, cited above).
     To evaluate the legitimacy of publishing information it is important to examine the motive for its 
publication. It can not be concluded that publication of information was legitimate if the dominant 
motive for it was the desire to damage the defamed person, if the disseminator himself did not believe 
the information, or if he provided it irresponsibly, without due concern for whether it was or was not 
true.
     Facts alleged to be defamatory must always be evaluated comprehensively, from many points of 
view, which can be expressed in the following points (concurring, see Amicus Curiae Opinion of the 
Venice Commission of 17 March 2004, CDL-AD(2004)011):
  1. The gravity of the charge. The more serious the charge is, the more the public was misinformed 
and the defamed person damaged, if the claim is not true.
  2.The nature of the information and a consideration of the degree to which the problem at hand is a 
matter of public interest.
  3. The source of the information. Some disseminators of information do not have direct knowledge of 
the event. Some have their own reasons to diffuse information or are paid for their stories.
  4. The effort expended and concrete steps taken to verify the truthfulness of information.
  5. The status of the information. The charge may already be the subject of investigation, which must 
be taken into consideration.
  6. The urgency of the matter. News is often a commodity which spoils quickly.
  7. Whether comments were requested from the complainant (plaintiff). He may have information 
which is not available to others or which they did not disclose. A request to the complainant (plaintiff) 
need not always be necessary.
  8. Whether an announcement spread by the media contained the substance of the matter seen through 
the eyes of the complainant (plaintiff).
  9. The tone of the announcement spread by the media. The originator of information spread in the 
media can initiate discussion or investigation. He need not present the charge as a disclosure of fact.
  10. The circumstances of the publication, including the timing.
     As regards the evaluative judgments, including exaggeration and hyperbole, even if they were 
harsh, they are not in and of themselves a non-permitted expression. Even the unsuitability of the 
critic's opinion, in terms of logic or the prejudice of the critic do not, by themselves, permit the 
conclusion that the critic went beyond the bounds of expression that can be described as appropriate. 
Only in the case of criticism of matters of actions by public persons which completely lacks a 
substantive basis, and for which no justification can be found, is it necessary to consider such criticism 
disproportionate. It is always necessary to evaluate the entire expression made in a literary, reporting, 
or other format; one can never judge a single expression or sentence taken out of context.
     Only if the free expression, thus understood, comes into conflict with other legal values protected 
by the constitutional order (the immanent limitation of fundamental rights - see judgment file no. Pl. 
US 42/02) or statutes pass for a purpose for which free expression can be limited under Art. 17 par. 4 
of the Charter (rights and freedoms of others, the security of the state, public security, public health, or 
morals), do conditions exist for testing a concrete expression from the points of view cited above. In 
evaluating these requirements in a concrete matter, it is necessary to weigh the legal values generally 
and specifically applied in the matter and standing in opposition to each other.

     B) A person's honor and good name are values which belong in the cultural heritage of our 
civilization, with its roots in Christianity and Judaism ("A good name is to be chosen rather than great 
riches, loving favor rather than silver and gold." Proverbs 22:1). However the content and scope of 
this value may change over time, we can conclude that it includes the rules which appear in the ethical 
codices of various professions, i.e. including the profession of journalist.
     Honor is also an integral and important component of human dignity. It also forms the basis of 
many decisions made my members of a democratic society, which are fundamental for it to function 
well. Honor plays a role in relationships, such as whom an employer hires, or whom an employee 
wants to work for, it is decisive in decisions about who is to advance to higher employment or official 
positions; honor is important for deciding with whom to begin business relations or whom to vote for 
in political life. If honor is once sullied by an unsubstantiated accusation expressed publicly, and all 
the more so in the media, a person's reputation and honor can be damaged forever, and especially in a 
situation where there is no possibility of rehabilitation. If such a situation arises, both the person 
himself and the society lose. And it is precisely for that reason that one can not assume that protection 
of reputation, or honor, is an important matter only for the affected individual or his family. For these 
reasons the protection of reputation or honor must be seen as protection of a public good. Therefore, it 
is in the public interest for the honor and reputation of persons active in public life not be discussed at 
factually altered levels. Both in the field of politics and in the media a voter must be able to distinguish 
good from evil, so that he can in the end make an informed choice in relation to a politician and to the 
media. It is precisely in view of these considerations that agreements on human rights, just like the 
Charter, do no consider freedom of expression to be an absolute right (see above).
     The fundamental right to honor is exercised in multiple spheres: the private sphere, the societal, 
civil and professional spheres; the last three can be described as the social sphere. The first sphere 
actually involves protection of privacy, where the right to honor is undoubtedly also applied. It is 
fundamentally up to each individual, what from that sphere, and to what extent, he will release as 
information for the outside world. In other words, this sphere is usually governed by self-
determination as regards information, which can not be intervened in from outside.
     The societal, civil and professional levels reflect the social nature of the fundamental rights, or 
reflect the fact that an individual lives in a society, and enters into communication with its other 
members, and through his conduct, or even through his very existence, influence other members of the 
society. In this second level we can not insist on complete self-determination regarding information; in 
other words, under certain circumstances one can intervene at this level. Thus, the social spheres can 
be interfered in through proportional interventions undertaken for purposes of protecting the interests 
of society. Because the rights to personal honor and a good reputation guaranteed by Art. 10 par. 1 of 
the Charter (this right is not independently guaranteed by the Convention) can not be limited by 
ordinary statutes, whose purpose would be set forth by the Charter as public values (as, for instance, in 
the case of freedom of expression), potential limitations of this right must be sought in the category of 
immanent limitations, i.e. limitations arising directly from the constitutional order itself. Such an 
immanent limitation of the fundamental right to honor can also be found in the requirement for 
protection of freedom of expression, which is also constitutionally protected (see above).

V.
In evaluating the matter from a constitutional viewpoint, the Constitutional Court began with the fact 
that the complainant, as a journalist - a commentator - is a person active in public life, and therefore 
his professional activity, in particular, may be subject to public criticism. However, the secondary 
party must prove the truthfulness of facts claimed in the critical statement, and the critical opinion 
expressed by him is subject to a test under the principle of proportionality.
     The Constitutional Court also evaluated the secondary party's statements and concluded that, with 
the exception of legal evaluation of the complainant's alleged conduct, they were claims of fact.
     Thus, the Constitutional Court subjected the secondary party's statements, insofar as their 
truthfulness was determined by the High Court, to the test described in part IV.
     Re 1) The Constitutional Court primarily reviewed the starting point of the High Court, which 
based its decision on evaluating the contested statements by the secondary party to the effect that the 
defendant truthfully informed the journalists about the statement by the general manager of CEZ and 
also identified him as the source of his information. Insofar as the secondary party described these 
statements as corruption, this was his opinion, which, by its nature, is not subject to proof of 
truthfulness.
     This evaluation of the secondary party's statements appears to the Constitutional Court to be 
flawed. In the first contested statement, made on 29 June 1999, the secondary party did not limit 
himself to repeating information which he had received form the general manager of CEZ, a.s. The 
manager testified as a witness before the High Court. The witness never spoke of a "confidential 
contract" between the complainant and CEZ. In the opinion of the Constitutional Court, the use of the 
term "confidential contract," which the secondary party used in the context of providing "evidence" 
about the corruption of a journalist, can be classified as a statement containing a claim of fact, which 
was intended to strengthen the argument about the impropriety of the complainant's alleged conduct. 
In contrast, as shown by the evidence admitted by the High Court, the information from the general 
manager about contracts with journalists, was neutral in terms of evaluating contracts with journalists.
     Also, one can not conclude from the total context of the information provided (originally this was 
an interview concerning alleged corruption of journalists on the part of J. Z.) that the purpose of 
providing information was to give information about what the general manager of CEZ told the 
secondary party.
     However, what is of primary importance is evaluation of the fact that it is not the role of the prime 
minister to provide information to journalists about a statement from the general manager of CEZ, 
even though this was a commercial company owned in considerable part by the state. It is 
unacceptable for the statements of the prime minister to be evaluated as if he were the press secretary 
of a private commercial company.
     In this light, the High Court's comparison with the printed media received by reports ("svodka") of 
the Police of the CR appears quite inappropriate. This is because an important function of the printed 
media is precisely to provide un-commented information, i.e. reportage. A paper owned by a private 
legal entity is fully entitled to rely on the truthfulness contained in the official records of the Police of 
the CR, because the truthfulness of official information provided by state bodies needs to be 
presumed, for reasons explained below. However, the secondary party provided at a minimum a report 
with comments, and precisely through his commentary strengthened the gravity of the accusation 
contained in his statement. It was clear from the evidence admitted by the court of the first instance 
that this was a serious accusation, affecting the area of the complainant's good reputation and 
professional honor under the journalistic codex, which also had serious consequences for the 
complainant's livelihood.
     Likewise, it is quite evident that the gravity of the accusation exceeded the complainant's personal 
interest, because the statement cast doubt upon the community of journalists as a professional group. 
Again, one can not overlook the context in which the statement was made, or the fact that it was meant 
to serve only as an example of a widespread phenomenon - corruption among journalists. Of course, 
creating an image of corrupt media has a devastating effect on relationships in a civil society, because 
individuals are generally completely reliant on information from the media in forming their opinions 
and subsequently projecting them into their daily decision making. However, the High Court did not 
consider the gravity of the accusation made by the secondary party in this context at all. 
     Re 2) What was said under Re 1) is also connected to the evaluation of the nature of this statement 
and its evaluation in terms of the public interest. Its content - corruption among journalists, with the 
provision of one piece of so-called evidence - is undoubtedly a matter of public interest, for the reason 
stated above under Re 1). The number of media reports which reacted to the prime minister's 
statement also testifies to this.
     Re 3) As regards the source of the information, the High Court relied on the determination that the 
secondary party did not have direct knowledge of the circumstances which were the content of his 
information. The High Court then relied on a completely unrealistic opinion, based on pre formalism, 
i.e. on the statement that if the secondary party was informed by a "statutory body," its information 
must be truthfully, and it concluded immaterially that it was not necessary to verify it further. In doing 
so it ignored the fact that CEZ is an enormous company, and no general manager can be informed 
about everything that happens in it, and also that it is highly unlikely, even impossible, that he will be 
informed about events which are not directly connected to the company's business activities or even 
about events which preceded a particular person's presence in the position.
     Primarily, however, the High Court did not at all evaluate the determined facts relating to the way 
in which the general manager of CEZ gave the information to the secondary party, the prime minister. 
The undisputed part of the testimony of the general manager of CEZ (p. 138) indicated that the prime 
minister asked the witness about the employment of journalists in an "antechamber" after a 
government meeting, around midnight, and the second meeting of the two men, which was said to last 
a few seconds, took place at an unspecified reception, where the general manager of CEZ informed the 
prime minister, erroneously, as was later shown, that he had cancelled the contract with the 
complainant.
     The time, manner and place of giving the "information" undoubtedly affected its quality, in the 
sense of its precision and the resulting truthfulness. And in fact, the subsequent verification of the 
content of the statement by the really properly informed professional staff of CEZ showed that it was 
untrue.
     The Constitutional Court believes that information provided to the public by persons holding high 
constitutional office can not be based on a source in the form of oral statements in conditions which 
will evoke in any reasonable person at least a suspicion that the person providing the information 
might have, because of the time, place, or atmosphere, had the impression that this was not serious 
information, and adapted his degree of care accordingly. Likewise, one must take into account that the 
person providing information, like the person receiving it, might have been either exhausted after a 
long working session (the first meeting of the two men) or distracted by the social atmosphere of the 
event - a reception - in which he was taking part. The Constitutional Court is convinced that 
information provided by high constitutional officials, containing such explosive potential as in this 
case, should be seriously verified by their professional staff before it is disclosed publicly, which was 
evidently not done in this case.
     The High Court also did not evaluate the secondary party's statement in terms of the context of the 
political situation in the country, or from the point of view of the political agenda of the government, 
of which the secondary party was then prime minister. One of the main points of the then 
government's political agenda was the fight against corruption. This publicly very beneficial agenda, 
however, also forms the context for this matter, and it must be evaluated in terms of evaluating the 
secondary party's motivation for making his statement. Fulfilling the political agenda could 
undoubtedly have been a strong motive for providing the information. The context for evaluating the 
motive must also be formed by evaluation of the truthfulness of the secondary party's statement, 
which had a similar content in relation to J. Z., as this statement is inseparably contextually tied to the 
statement being contested.
     Re 4) In contrast to the High Court, for the reasons given under Re 3, the Constitutional Court 
considers the secondary party's demonstrably expended effort to verify the truthfulness of his 
subsequent statement completely inadequate in view of the defamatory potential it contained. On the 
contrary, it considers the demonstrated effort to be inadequate in relation to the secondary party's 
opportunities to verify the truthfulness of the information. At that time the secondary party could rely 
on the work of an enormous administrative apparatus which arranged or could arrange background 
materials for public appearances for him.
     Re 5) The status of the information was explained under point III of this judgment, i.e. as conduct 
ultra vires in relation to the jurisdiction of the government of the CR. Exceeding the bounds of 
government jurisdiction, however, always has, and in this case had, serious consequences. Information 
provided by the prim minister is always given greater weight by the citizens that information coming 
from other persons, including the media. A citizen of a democratic law-based state quite naturally 
expects truthful information from constitutional officials and also expects that constitutional officials 
will maintain absolute respect for individual persons who are members of the civil society.
     This principle is also a starting point for the very idea of a democratic law-based state. The cited, 
rightfully expected respect of course completely rules out the defamation of individuals by the state 
power (which constitutional officials represent). Therefore, the representatives of state authority are 
required to make public only thoroughly verified information which, in addition, relates only to 
matters which fall under their areas of jurisdiction. If a constitutional official has not had his claims of 
fact thoroughly verified as to their truthfulness, he is not entitled to make them public. These starting 
points apply all the more so in the case of claiming facts which threaten to defame individual persons, 
even if these persons are active in public affairs.
     No state which is to be considered democratic and law-based can function without meeting this 
fundamental requirement. Defamation of individuals by representatives of state power and the 
resulting misinformation of all members of society is, in contrast, a technique well-known to 
totalitarian regimes. Therefore, our experience from the period before 1989 also dictates that it is 
necessary to insist quite firmly on the observance of the above-mentioned principles, which the High 
Court overlooked.
     Re 6) Evaluation of the urgency of the information provided by the secondary party must be 
performed in the context of the considerations set forth above, especially those contained under Re 4 
and 5.
     Re 7) The High Court did not even pose the question whether the secondary party asked the 
complainant for comments on his intended statement, and therefore, of course, it did not consider this 
aspect. Although it can be conceded that the secondary party did not have to ask for the complainant's 
comments, this would apply only if he had verified the truthfulness of the intended statement in the 
ways indicated above. The same applies for the evaluation of the High Court from the point of view of 
point 8 of the test cited above.
     Re 9) The tone of the secondary party's first contested statement was that of an announcement. In 
addition, the secondary party introduced his claim with the sentence: "Since you constantly want some 
concrete evidence of corruption among journalists, let me give you some." His statement contains not 
even a suggestion of doubts, which could be interpreted as an invitation for subsequent discussion 
about the alleged corruption among journalists. However, for reasons given under Re 5), it can not be 
conceded that a person holding constitutional office would be permitted, even by posing rhetorical 
questions, to initiate discussion to the detriment of the honor and reputation of a private person. Such 
an action, and only with a large dose of caution, can be permitted, under certain circumstances, with, 
for example, investigative journalism. However, the position of prime minister is not comparable with 
the purpose of the activities of an investigative journalist.
     Re 10) The High Court did not consider the circumstances under which the first contested 
statement was made at all in the sense set forth above (in particular under Re 3 and 5), and for that 
reason too its conclusions must be considered defective.
     At the close of the tested first statement by the secondary party the Constitutional Court says, 
borrowing the words of a writer who penetrates deep under the surface of events and things, that the 
general courts which will decide the matter again should bear in mind that even the ground of mere 
determination of facts is muddy and slippery and it is difficult to stand on it. Even a fact is not 
something clear and unprejudiced (Salman Rushdie, essay "When The Prisoner Is the Facts," Mlada 
Fronta Dnes, 25 June 2005, p. E-II).
     As regards evaluation of the High Court's decision relating to the secondary party's claim made on 
30 June 1999 on CT, 3 July 1999 on Radiozurnal, and 16 July 1999 at a press conference in Lidovy 
dum, to this extent it is a non-reviewable decision, because it is given practically no justification, or 
only a general one, without individual statements being analyzed, although they differ from the 
statement which the secondary party made on 29 June 1999, i.e. from the first statement, and moreover 
were made in a considerably different situation than the first statement.
     In the case of the second statement, it will thus be necessary to evaluate especially the fact that the 
secondary party completely neglected to reproduce the explanatory apology from the general manager 
of CEZ, published together with a statement from the press secretary of CEZ, which he mentioned, 
and likewise neglected to deal with the published statement by the complainant himself. If the 
secondary party had honestly mentioned all these statements, he could not have continued to pose 
rhetorical questions, in which the Constitutional Court can not find any purpose other than continuing 
to cast doubt on the complainant's honor and good reputation.
     In the third case, the secondary party added to the description of the genesis of his accusation 
relating to the claimant information about the content of the program "Nahrane" aired by CT on 22 
March 1999. This information is also a claim of fact which, however, as the file indicates, was not 
true. The secondary party stated that an environmental activist accused the complainant of writing 
articles favoring nuclear energy for CEZ, for payment from CEZ. However, as the Constitutional 
Court determined from the file, the environmental activist J. Beranek only said that CEZ was printing 
the complainant's articles as paid advertising. This untrue claim of fact set forth by the secondary 
party in connection with the original statement by the general manager of CEZ, which had been quite 
reliably refuted by that time, i.e. after his apology, which was well known to the secondary party, in 
and of itself represents considerable interference in the complainant's honor and reputation. It also 
testifies to the fact that the secondary party quite incomprehensibly refused to take cognizance of the 
explanation and apology by the general manager of CEZ, as he began to perform a kind of quasi-
analysis of the steps taken by the general manager of CEZ, in the conclusion of which, without any 
kind of substantiation, he cast doubt on the truthfulness of the apology, and on the contrary, worked 
only with his original, untrue information. A question arises which will have to be considered, 
whether, on the contrary, by adding untrue information on the content of the program "Nahrane" was 
not intended to compensate for the objectively weakening ring of the original information provided by 
the secondary party on the basis of the original untrue information from the general manager of CEZ. 
Again, the High Court did not ask this question, although answering it was essential for evaluating the 
third statement comprehensively and in the context in which it was made.
     As regards the fourth statement, the secondary party repeated the untruthful claim about the content 
of the television program "Nahrane" and repeated his version of the course of events, and then 
described everything as "completely clear arguments," on which he relied. All this was in response to 
the complainant's question whether there was evidence of his corruption. This time he completely 
omitted any mention of the denial provided by CEZ, the apology by its general manager, as well as the 
complainant's own statement. These circumstances too remained outside the attention and evaluation 
of the High Court. 
     In evaluating the secondary party's expression made in the first statement that he considers the 
conduct he described to be a form of corruption, the Constitutional Court states that one can agree with 
the High Court to the extent that this was an expression of an opinion, the truthfulness of which 
fundamentally can not be verified. However, it can not be overlooked that this was an expression of a 
particular kind of opinion, i.e. a legal opinion. The proportionality of the expressed opinion can be 
reviewed, in fact it must be tested, but the High Court did not even try to conduct such a test. Yet it is 
evident that even when evaluating the proportionality of an expressed legal opinion the then official 
position of the secondary party must be taken into consideration. 
     Errors in the legal evaluation of the complainant's alleged conduct are scarcely tolerable in the case 
of the secondary party. There were several lawyers in the government of which he was prime minister 
at that time; he had an opportunity, even an obligation, to discuss the matter with them, regardless of 
any desirable or even required consultations with the professional staff of the office of the 
government. In other words, the heightened requirements for the proportionality of the secondary 
party's statement again develop from his then official position, and they can not be subject to 
parameters applied, for example, to the media, where a certain degree of imprecision in the legal 
evaluation of actions by persons on whom they report can be tolerated, though even in that case the 
tolerance can not be unlimited. However, the general courts did not determine whether the secondary 
party had any consultations with legal experts regarding the legal classification of the complainant's 
alleged conduct.
     For all the above-mentioned reasons, and weight the importance of freedom of expression on one 
side, and the importance of the honor and reputation of persons on the other side, the Constitutional 
Court must state that the High Court's verdict completely ignored the importance of the latter value, 
which led to flagrant interference in the complainant's subjective right, the fundamental right to 
protection of honor and good reputation, which is guaranteed by Art. 10 par. 1 of the Charter.
     The secondary party's statement did not hold up under the test conducted by the Constitutional 
Court; therefore, neither did the decision of the High Court, which approved it, both in terms of 
evaluating the truthfulness of the contested statements as regards the facts claimed, and as regards the 
proportionality of the opinion expressed. The High Court did not provide protection for the claimant's 
honor and good reputation, and, surprisingly for the Constitutional Court, provided protection to the 
secondary party's fundamental right to freedom of expression, although in the instant case that right 
was exercised in conflict with a number of principles whose observance is a condition for protecting 
that right. 
     As regards evaluation of the decision of the Supreme Court of the CR, which denied the claimant's 
appeal on a point of law, that decision continued the interference in the claimant's fundamental rights. 
The Constitutional Court considers it necessary to point out that it does not understand the reasoning 
of that decision, which is composed of quotations from judicial case law primarily from the 1980s, and 
is more reminiscent of a post-modernist collage open to many interpretations than the reasoning of a 
court decision in the sense of evaluating a particular case in light of constitutional values and 
principles, interpreted in the context of contemporary European case law on analogous matters. It is 
evident from such case law how the approaches by individual European states in interpreting the 
principles applied to resolving conflicts between the right to freedom of expression and the right to 
honor and a good reputation approach each other. because the Supreme Court of the CR did not meet 
the above-mentioned requirements, it was also necessary to annul its decision.
     In view of the foregoing, the Constitutional Court granted the constitutional complaint under § 82 
par. 2 let. a) in connection with par. 3 let. a) of the Act on the Constitutional Court, and annulled the 
contested decisions, because it found that the decision of the High Court in Prague and of the Supreme 
Court of the CR violate the complainant's fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 10 par. 1 of the 
Charter.

Notice: Decisions of the Constitutional Court can not be appealed
Brno 11 November 2005


Dissenting Opinion 
of judge Michaela Zidlicka

I do not agree with the verdicts of the judgment; Nevertheless, I consider it beneficial to address in this 
form a question which I consider fundamental and which was not given attention in the reasoning of 
the decision.
     In the instant case, the substance of the problem was the legal opinion of the High Court in Prague 
that the information made public by the secondary party, Ing. M. Z., was truthful, and therefore not 
capable of causing unjustified interference in the complainant's personal rights. The High Court 
concluded that the secondary party, by identifying the source of the information, only truthfully 
reproduced the content of his conversation with Ing. C.; this was not affected at all by the fact that the 
information provided by Ing. C. was shown to be untrue. Of course, such an interpretation is 
unacceptable from a constitutional viewpoint, because it gives priority to formal logic over the 
realistic meaning of the communication, as it is understood by the hearers, and it overlooks the 
possible negative effects of such conduct on the sphere of the complainant's personality.
     The secondary party's statement, leaving aside his evaluative judgments, can be considered truthful 
in terms of logic; nonetheless, we can not overlook that it completely lacks completeness, which is 
decisive for evaluating the truthfulness of information in its material sense. An erroneous impression 
was created among the recipients of the information mediated by the secondary party that the 
information provided to the secondary party by Ing. C., was also truthful, because the secondary 
party's statement did not contain even a suggestion that this need not be the case. It is completely non-
decisive whether the secondary party should or could have verified the actual situation, because 
liability for unjustified interference in personal rights is strict liability, which does not require 
causation in any form.
     There is not the slightest doubt that the entire incident could negatively affect the complainant's 
personal sphere. For that reason too the High Court's interpretation can not be accepted, because this 
would result in a situation where the person who made the statement would not be responsible for real 
interference in the complainant's personality rights, nor would the person who provided the initiative 
for it, because his communication was not public, and therefore it would obviously not be possible to 
conclude a causal connection between the conduct of the person communicating the information and 
the subsequent interference in personality rights.
     Fundamental rights and freedoms may be limited if they conflict, even if the constitutional 
framework does not expect such limitation. In these situations it is necessary to set forth conditions 
under which one fundamental right or freedom has priority, and conditions under which the other has 
priority. In this regard there is a fundamental maxim that a fundamental right or freedom may be 
limited only in the interest of another fundamental right or freedom (Constitutional Court judgment of 
17 February 1999, file no. Pl. US 16/98, published in the Collection of Laws as no. 68/1999 Coll.). In 
the event of balancing two fundamental rights and freedoms it is always necessary, in view of Art. 4 
par. 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, to preserve the essence and significance of 
the right which is to cede to another right. The interpretation of the High Court in Prague does not 
meet this fundamental condition, because it provides protection for the expression of the secondary 
party, while ignoring the true significance of his communication, and permits the complainant to be 
denied an opportunity to defend himself against actually existing interference in his fundamental right 
to protection of his honor and good name under Art. 10 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms. For that reason I voted to annul the contested decision of the High Court in Prague, as well 
as that of the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic, which did not recognize the foregoing lack of 
constitutionality .

Brno 11 November 2005